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Abstract
For many products, platforms enable sellers to transact with buyers. We show
that the competitive conditions among sellers shape the market structure in plat-
form industries. If product market competition is tough, sellers avoid competitors
by joining different platforms. This allows platforms to sustain high fees and ex-
plains why, for example, in some online markets, several homogeneous platforms
segment the market. Instead, if product market competition is soft, agglomeration
on a single platform emerges, and platforms fight for the dominant position. These
insights give rise to novel predictions. For instance, market concentration and fees
are negatively correlated in platform industries, which inverts the standard logic of
competition.
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1 Introduction
In many industries, platforms offer intermediation services and play the essential role of
enabling transactions between buyers and sellers—more prominently so, with the migra-
tion of trade from physical venues to the Internet. For example, in the rental market, the
main bulk of matching landlords and tenants is done via Internet platforms such as Right-
move and Zoopla in the UK, or Immobilienscout24 and Immowelt in Germany. Other
examples include the used car market and markets for other used items or collectibles,
in which a large fraction of transactions is initiated via portals.
The market structure for intermediation services differs considerably across industries
and space. While, for example, Ebay dominates the second-hand market in many product
classes in several countries, the rental housing market is often segmented, and two (or
more) platforms have non-negligible market shares.1
In this paper, we provide a theoretical framework to examine these differences in plat-
form market structure. We find that the market structure is shaped by the competitive
conditions in the product market. These conditions are responsible for the fees set by
platforms and, thus, for platforms’ profits and for the number of active platforms.
As is well-known, platform markets may have the tendency to tip due to positive
cross-group external effects between buyers and sellers (i.e., each buyer benefits from
more sellers on the same portal and vice versa). This has been shown in the seminal
work by Caillaud and Jullien (2001, 2003) and rationalizes the phenomenon of market
agglomeration, in which all agents locate on a single platform. However, in several indus-
tries, two or more platforms have non-negligible market shares, and agents join different
platforms. The existing literature explains market segmentation with platforms offering
differentiated matching services (e.g., Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Armstrong, 2006).
In the above examples, and more broadly for many Internet platforms, there is little
room for service differentiation; that is, platforms offer services that often appear to be
quite the same. Therefore, it remains a puzzle how competing platforms share the market
and earn positive profits.
Our answer to this puzzle is that multiple homogeneous platforms can serve the role
of relaxing competition between sellers in the product market. In a nutshell, if sellers
decide to be active on different platforms, some buyers will not be informed about all
offers, which, in turn, relaxes competition between sellers. Platforms benefit from this
provision of endogenous segmentation by charging sellers larger fees. Thus, multiple
1Even within the same industry, differences between countries can be observed. For example, in the
daily deals market, in which platforms mediate transactions of discounted products and services through
coupons, Groupon has a dominant position with market shares of around 80% in several European
countries, whereas in the US the market is more segmented, with Groupon and LivingSocial being the
market leaders (Kim, Lee and Park, 2017).
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homogeneous platforms earn positive profits.
We identify the competitive conditions in the product market as the key driver of the
arising market structure. If product market competition is soft (e.g., because sellers offer
highly differentiated products), agglomeration forces dominate. Then, platforms follow
a strategy of “play hard and fight it out” to become the dominant platform, which leads
to low fees (at least in the short term, when the number of platforms is exogenous). If,
instead, product market competition is tough, multiple platforms segment the market to
relax seller competition. Platforms then “play soft” and charge high fees.
Dudey (1990) and Ellison and Fudenberg (2003) demonstrate that under tough prod-
uct market competition, sellers benefit from allocating at different marketplaces. In those
papers, however, marketplaces are not managed by platforms and do not charge fees to
sellers. Our analysis advances this literature by confirming that market segmentation can
arise even with fee-setting platforms. Yet, we find that fees are strictly positive under
market segmentation.
Overall, our paper provides testable predictions of how the competitive environment
faced by sellers drives the equilibrium market structure and the platforms’ equilibrium
choice of listing fees. Tough competition between sellers implies high platform fees and
profits. Therefore, the correlation between competition in the product market and com-
petition in the market for intermediation services is negative. In addition, a lower mar-
ket concentration in platform markets due to multiple active platforms go together with
higher listing fees. This implies that the relation between the Hirshman-Herfindahl Index
(HHI) and the markup is reversed in platform markets versus standard oligopoly markets.
To provide casual evidence for the existence of market segmentation in platform in-
dustries, we carried out searches on the German rental platforms Immobilienscout24 and
Immowelt. An example is the search for rental apartments in Frankfurt am Main, Ger-
many with the following search criteria: “at least 3 rooms”; “at least 100 m2”; and
“distance less than 1 kilometer to the centre.” The search on November 23, 2015 resulted
in 12 matches on each portal. We report the matches in Table 1 in ascending order of
rental price by stating the square meters of the apartment and the rental price in Euros.
Out of these 12 matches, only two could be found on both platforms.2 This appears to
be consistent with the idea of market segmentation by platforms.
Our theoretical framework applies also to industries beyond e-commerce. A case in
point are industry standards; for example, the modem standard for end-user Internet
access in the 1990s: Augereau, Greenstein, and Rysman (2006) find that two different,
but functionally equivalent modem standards were used by Internet Service Providers
(ISPs, which would be the sellers in our model) despite positive effects of standardization.
2Offer 11 on Immobilienscout24 is the same apartment as offer 9 on Immowelt, and offer 12 on
Immobilienscout24 is the same apartment as offer 11 on Immowelt.
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Immobilienscout24 Immowelt
1. m2:103.78; Rent:1.350 m2:111.00; Rent:1.285
2. m2:110.00; Rent:1.450 m2:104.00; Rent:1.290
3. m2:100.00; Rent:1.450 m2:117.00; Rent:1.350
4. m2:105.90; Rent:1.450 m2:103.56; Rent:1.490
5. m2:129.02; Rent:1.548 m2:114.00; Rent:1.550
6. m2:124.74; Rent:1.597 m2:145.00; Rent:1.650
7. m2:142.00; Rent:1.700 m2:100.00; Rent:1.800
8. m2:136.00; Rent:1.890 m2:140.00; Rent:1.970
9. m2:137.48; Rent:2.007 m2:140.00; Rent:2.450
10. m2:173.00; Rent:2.290 m2:160.00; Rent:2.800
11. m2:140.00; Rent:2.450 m2:152.00; Rent:2.830
12. m2:152.00; Rent:2.830 m2:200.00; Rent:3.200
Table 1: Apartment offers in ascending order of the rental price
This helped ISPs to reduce competition (by creating switching costs for consumers). As
a result, the two modem standards obtained similar market shares and, thus, segmented
the market.
In our baseline model, multiple platforms compete on listing fees charged to sellers.
Buyers prefer platforms with many sellers, and vice versa. Sellers offer a single prod-
uct that belongs to one out of many different product categories, and there are multiple
sellers within the product category competing with each other. To present the results
in the simplest way, we focus on the case with only two platforms and two sellers per
category. All of our results extend to a general number of platforms and sellers and
to per-transaction fees or two-part tariffs. After platforms set their listing fees, sellers
and buyers decide simultaneously which platform to join and, thus, play a coordination
game. We show that the selection criterion of coalition-proofness, in combination with
profit dominance of sellers, generates a clear-cut equilibrium prediction in this coordina-
tion game. This allows us to establish necessary and sufficient conditions when either
agglomeration or segmentation emerges.
A tipping equilibrium prevails if the degree of competition between sellers is low.
This is in line with the case of Ebay in the example above, as competition between sellers
of a particular second-hand product on Ebay is presumably relatively soft. Buyers are
then informed about all offers, implying that sellers are in competition with each other.
However, demand is also higher as all buyers are on the same platform. The effect of
increased demand dominates increased competition. Platforms compete fiercely to win
the market, which leads to a Bertrand-style competition between platforms, and their
listing fees are driven down to marginal cost.3
3Agglomeration, therefore, does not imply that a platform acts as a monopolist. Instead, another
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By contrast, if competition between sellers in a product category is sufficiently intense,
they prefer to be active on different platforms. Buyers will split on the two platforms
and do not become informed about all offers. Thus, platforms segment the market,
and competition between sellers is relaxed. This finding is in line with the examples of
Rightmove vs. Zoopla and Immobilienscout24 vs. Immowelt on the rental market, as
landlords and rental agencies often compete for the best tenants. Segmentation then
allows platforms to obtain strictly positive profits. If a platform were to deviate from
the associated equilibrium listing fees by charging a lower fee, sellers would not have an
incentive to switch to this platform, as this would intensify competition among them.
If the degree of competition between sellers is moderate, a mixed-strategy equilibrium
in listing fees occurs, in which platforms segment the market with positive probability.
Confirming the result described above, if the degree of competition between sellers gets
larger, the probability for segmentation increases, and so does the expected profit of
platforms, as they charge higher fees.
While our baseline model features single-homing of agents on both sides, we sub-
sequently allow for multi-homing buyers and sellers and show that our solution to the
puzzle that multiple platforms share the market carries over. We find that platforms
obtain lower profits with seller multi-homing as multi-homing makes agglomeration more
likely.
Existing literature with differentiated platforms has shown that seller multi-homing
allows competing platforms to exert monopoly power over sellers and to possibly in-
crease their profits. By contrast, we find that seller multi-homing may affect the market
structure and has, thereby, a different effect on platform profits: Due to multi-homing,
sellers may profitably deviate from segmentation by becoming active on both platforms
and, thus, making offers to all buyers. This might render segmentation unstable. Then,
agglomeration occurs, and platforms unambiguously receive lower profits.
From a welfare perspective, segmentation is inefficient. The reason is that matching
quality is lower, as buyers are not informed about all offers, and the deadweight loss is
higher than under agglomeration due to higher product market prices. As a consequence
for competition policy, restraints such as exclusive dealing contracts, which platforms may
impose on sellers, are anticompetitive, as they prevent seller multi-homing and, thus, are
likely to induce segmentation.
In the remainder of this section, we discuss the related literature. In Section 2, we
set out the baseline model and, in Section 3, characterize the equilibrium. In Section 4,
we analyze the effects of multi-homing by buyers and sellers. We present generalizations
of our baseline model, including the use of alternative platform pricing instruments, any
constraining platform is present, but this platform has only a small market share. In this respect, the
platform market is contestable. We discuss this in more detail in Section 7.
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number of platforms and sellers, and a different equilibrium selection in Section 5. In
Section 6, we discuss policy implications and empirical predictions. Section 7 concludes.
All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Related Literature Our paper contributes to the literature on competition in two-sided
markets, pioneered by Caillaud and Jullien (2001, 2003), Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006),
and Armstrong (2006). Caillaud and Jullien (2001, 2003) analyze homogeneous platforms
and show that the market tips to one platform under relatively general conditions. Rochet
and Tirole (2003, 2006) and Armstrong (2006), by contrast, consider platforms that
are sufficiently differentiated so that no tipping occurs. The focus of these papers (and
generally in the two-sided market literature) is on cross-group externalities between agents
of both sides but not on competition between agents on the same side (as sellers do in
our model). Armstrong (2006) considers seller competition in an extension, and shows
that platforms may restrict seller competition to obtain higher profits. In contrast to our
paper, in his framework, all platforms are active due to exogenous differentiation.
A few papers in the two-sided markets literature analyze competition between sellers.
Nocke, Peitz and Stahl (2007), Galeotti and Moraga-Gonza´lez (2009), and Gomes (2014)
analyze platform ownership, search, and optimal auction design, respectively, but consider
a monopoly platform, whereas Belleflamme and Toulemonde (2009) study competition
between a for-profit and a not-for-profit platform. Dukes and Gal-Or (2003) and Hagiu
(2006) consider competition between for-profit platforms and analyze either exclusivity
contracts or price commitment by platforms.4 None of these papers analyzes how the
market structure depends on seller competition.5
Ellison, Fudenberg, and Mo¨bius (2004) consider competition between two auction
sides. They derive conditions for sellers to be active on different platforms, as this lowers
the seller-buyer ratio on each platform and leads to higher prices. Ellison and Fudenberg
(2003) provide general conditions such that tipping does not occur in markets with cross-
group external effects. The key difference from our paper is that they do not consider
fee-setting by platforms (i.e., fees are zero in their setup).6
The literature on firms’ location decisions analyzes the benefits and costs of clustering
from a different angle. For example, Dudey (1990) shows that sellers prefer agglomeration
in one marketplace over fragmentation, as lower product prices are more than offset by
4In line with the previous literature, Hagiu (2006) shows that if commitment is not possible and
agents single-home, an agglomeration equilibrium with zero profits emerges.
5An exception is Halaburda, Piskorski and Yilidrim (2017) who consider a matching market with
heterogeneous agents. They show that agents with low outside options prefer a platform with restricted
choice which leads to market segmentation with platforms of different size. By contrast, in our paper
segmentation occurs with homogeneous agents on either side and leads to symmetric platforms.
6Ellison, Fudenberg, and Mo¨bius (2004), in their Section 7, briefly analyze platform pricing. However,
since they do not make assumptions on equilibrium selection in the coordination game between sellers
and buyers, they do not provide a unique mapping from fees to market structure.
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increased demand. Stahl (1982) demonstrates that a similar effect arises if buyers are
attracted by a greater variety of goods. Church and Gandal (1992) analyze a related
model applied to the software market. In contrast to our paper, marketplaces are open
platforms in the sense that access is free. Instead, we are interested in markets with
fee-setting platforms and the resulting market structure.7
Our paper also contributes to the literature on price comparison websites. In the
seminal paper, Baye and Morgan (2001) show how homogeneous firms obtain positive
profits, even if a website informs buyers about all prices. The idea is that firms still
sell in their local market, where buyers are not informed about all prices. This leads
to price dispersion in equilibrium. This result has been tested empirically (e.g., Brown
and Goolsbee, 2002; Baye and Morgan, 2004) and the theoretical framework has been
extended (e.g., Ronayne, 2015). In contrast to these papers, we analyze competition
between websites in addition to competition between sellers.
2 The Setup
2.1 Baseline Model
We consider markets in which buyers and sellers trade via platforms. In what follows,
we describe the three types of agents—platforms, sellers, and buyers.
Platforms. Two homogeneous platforms A and B offer listing services to sellers. The
platforms enable transactions between sellers of products or services and their prospective
buyers. To be listed on platform i, a seller has to pay a listing fee fi, i ∈ {A,B}. Such
listing fees are prevalent in markets in which platforms cannot or do not monitor the sale
of a product—for example, in the housing or rental market. Buyers can access platforms
for free.8 For simplicity, we assume that all platform costs are zero.
Sellers. Sellers have to decide which, if any, platform to join. In the baseline model,
they cannot be active on both platforms (i.e., sellers single-home)—in Section 4.2, we
show that our results carry over to the case with multi-homing sellers.9 The product of
each seller belongs to a product category. There is a mass 1 of such categories, indexed
by k ∈ [0, 1].
7An exception is Gehrig (1998), who considers Hotelling competition between marketplaces and com-
petition on the circle (Salop, 1979) between sellers. He shows that agglomeration equilibria may emerge
(with positive platform profit), despite platform differentiation.
8We discuss the case of two-sided pricing in Section 5.4.
9In some industries, single-homing is a natural assumption. For example, in the market for private
accommodations, apartment owners have difficulties synchronizing the calendars when they are active
on more than one platform. This favors single-homing. Other examples are the daily deals market, in
which sellers cannot offer the same deal on more than one platform, or the modem market for Internet
access in which each ISP can use only one modem for technological reasons.
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For simplicity, we assume that there are two sellers in each product category.10 Sellers
are symmetric and obtain an equilibrium per-buyer profit pid in duopoly. If buyers can
buy from only one of the sellers because only this seller is listed on the platform that
buyers are patronizing, the seller makes a monopoly profit pim per buyer, with pim ≥ pid.
Our formulation implies that per-buyer profit in duopoly and monopoly is independent
of the number of buyers. At the end of this section, we provide several micro-foundations
that fulfill this property. However, we also demonstrate that our qualitative results hold
more generally. For the sake of concreteness, we assume that sellers engage in price
competition and set uniform prices to buyers. We denote the symmetric equilibrium
duopoly price by pd and the monopoly price by pm.
In the baseline model, there is no interdependence between categories.11 This rep-
resents the fact that, although platforms usually list many items (a continuum in our
model), there is competition between only a few of them. For example, a price compari-
son website often has thousands or even millions of listed products, but only a few items
match a buyer’s search and are displayed to the buyer. Similarly, housing platforms are
host to many houses and apartments, but a buyer seeking a house of a particular size in
her preferred city is not interested in listings in other categories.
Buyers. Each buyer single-homes—that is, she decides to be active on (up to) one
platform.12 She is interested in a single product category and derives a positive gross
utility only from products in this category—see, e.g., Burguet, Caminal, and Ellman
(2016) for a similar structure. There is mass 1 of buyers per product category. When
visiting a platform, a buyer becomes informed about her preferred product category and
the price of all products listed on the platform.13 If a platform lists sellers’ products from
a fraction α ∈ [0, 1] of all categories, a buyer expects to find a product from her preferred
category with probability α.
A buyer obtains a different (indirect) utility if one or two sellers are listed in her
preferred category. Prior to observing the idiosyncratic taste realization within this
category, the buyer obtains an expected utility of V d if she expects two sellers to be
listed in her preferred category. If she expects only one seller to be listed, her expected
utility is V m < V d. The reason for this inequality is twofold: First, if two sellers are listed,
they charge the duopoly price pd, which, in many instances, is less than pm. Second, if
10In Section 5.2, we show that all our results carry over to the situation with a general number of
sellers per category and a general number of platforms.
11We discuss several possible interactions between categories in Section 5.5.
12In Section 4.1, we provide the analysis with multi-homing buyers and demonstrate that our main
insights remain valid.
13The assumption that a buyer learns her preferred category only after deciding which platform to
visit is only made to simplify the analysis. All results would also hold if buyers knew their preferred
category already at the outset.
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sellers are differentiated, and buyers have a taste for variety, a buyer will find a product
closer to her preferences or may buy a positive amount of both products if two sellers are
listed instead of only one.
Timing. The timing is as follows:
1. Platforms A and B set listing fees fA and fB, respectively.
2. Sellers and buyers make a discrete choice between platforms A and B, and the
outside option (normalized to zero).
3. Sellers in each category set product prices.
4. Buyers observe all offers on the platform they are visiting and make their purchasing
decisions.
We make three observations regarding our setup. First, according to our timing,
sellers decide where to list before setting their prices on the product market. This is the
relevant timing in most applications because the choice of platform is typically longer-
term than the pricing decision. Therefore, sellers set prices after learning about the
number of competitors in the product market. In addition, listing fees are often paid on
a subscription basis, which makes them lumpy. By contrast, prices charged by the sellers
are flexible.
Second, listing fees do not enter the pricing decisions of sellers in the third stage
because they are “fixed” costs for sellers (which are, in addition, sunk when sellers set
prices). As we show in Section 5.1, our results still hold with per-transaction fees or
revenue shares, which affect sellers’ pricing decisions.
Third, we do not impose a particular model of buyer-seller interaction for the sub-
game starting at stage 3 and, instead, use a reduced-form approach with several micro-
foundations provided in Section 2.2.
Payoffs. The profit of platform i is the number of sellers active on platform imultiplied
by the listing fee fi. The profit of a seller who is listed on platform i is βipi − fi, where
βi is the fraction of buyers in the seller’s category that are active on platform i, and pi
is either pim if the rival seller is not listed on platform i or pid if the rival also lists on
platform i. As mentioned above, the utility of a buyer is V d or V m and, thus, depends
on the number of sellers listed in the buyer’s preferred category; the utility is 0 if none
of those sellers is listed on the platform.
Solution Concept. Our solution concept is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. We
assume the following tie-breaking rule. If buyers expect one seller in each category to list
on platform A and the other seller on platform B, half of the buyers in each category
join platform A and the other half platform B. A natural interpretation is that each
buyer mixes with equal probability to be active on either platform A or B. Since there
is a continuum of buyers, both platforms will, in fact, be patronized by one half of the
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buyers.14 As we point out below, this assumption is not crucial for the results and can
be relaxed, allowing for unequal distributions of buyers in the case of indifference.
In the second stage, buyers and sellers face a coordination game on which platform(s)
to be active, which may lead to a multiplicity of equilibria. To deal with this well-known
issue in two-sided markets, we impose the refinement of coalition-proofness (see e.g.,
Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston, 1987a, 1987b). That is, we select only Nash equilibria
that are stable against deviations by coalitions of sellers and buyers; and, within the
coalition, no subset of sellers and buyers benefits from a further deviation.15 In addition,
when coalition-proofness is not sufficient to obtain equilibrium uniqueness, we select
equilibria that are profit-dominant for sellers. We will show that the joint application of
these refinements leads to a unique equilibrium outcome at stage 1.16
A justification of the refinement is that the outcome is equivalent to the outcome
of a sequential game in which sellers decide which platform to join before buyers do,
as considered, for example, by Hagiu (2006), and sellers play a coalition-proof Nash
equilibrium. In Section 5.3, we analyze the mirror case, in which the payoff-dominant
equilibrium for buyers is selected, and we demonstrate that the main insights of our
analysis will be unchanged.
Summary statistic. As will become clear in Section 3, the key summary statistic for
our equilibrium characterization is the ratio pid/pim, which is an inverse measure of the
degree of product market competition and takes values in [0, 1]. It is determined by the
buyer-seller interaction at stages 3 and 4.
2.2 Micro-Foundation of the Buyer-Seller Interaction
Buyers’ choices in stage 4 and sellers’ pricing decisions in stage 3 are straightforward: In
the fourth stage, a buyer buys one or both products in her preferred product category
according to her demand function, provided that there is at least one listed seller on the
platform where the buyer is active. In the third stage, sellers set pd in case they face a
14Another interpretation is that platforms are differentiated by different platform designs but that
this differentiation is negligibly small. For example, platforms are differentiated along a Hotelling line,
and the transport cost parameter t goes to zero. This means that buyers ex ante have lexicographic
preferences, in the sense that they prefer the platform with a larger number of sellers. Buyers decide
according to their preference for different platform designs only if they expect this number to be the
same across platforms.
15In our game, a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium is equivalent to a Strong Nash equilibrium (Aumann,
1959), which ignores deviations by subcoalitions. This is due to buyers within each category being
symmetric and sellers benefiting from the presence of more buyers.
16Our equilibrium concept differs from the one imposed by Caillaud and Jullien (2003) and Jullien
(2011), who consider favorable expectations for one platform (the incumbent) in case of a fee deviation
by the rival platform (the entrant). By contrast, in our model, agents form expectations after observing
platform prices, and expectations are symmetric.
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competitor in their product category on the platform and pm in case of monopoly.
In this subsection, we provide several micro-foundations of the buyer-seller interaction
at stages 3 and 4 and, thus, determine the equilibrium per-buyer profits pid and pim. The
first two examples are widely-used oligopoly models: a discrete product choice model
(Hotelling) and a representative consumer model (Bowley, 1924, or Singh and Vives,
1984). Both examples fulfill all our assumptions, and we use the example on Hotelling
competition as our lead example.17 The third example extends price competition to
a simple setting of thin markets in which there is only a small number of buyers and
capacity-constrained sellers (as in the housing market). In the fourth example, sellers do
not use prices as their strategic variable but quantities. The latter two examples do not
fulfill all assumptions set out above (as there is only a finite number of buyers in Example
3, and sellers compete in quantities in Example 4). However, because only pid and pim
are relevant for our results, we can restate the model so that it is in line with Example
3 or 4.18
Example 1: Price competition in the Hotelling model.
Consider Hotelling competition in each product category. Each seller is located at one
of the extreme points of the unit interval in a particular category—i.e., a seller j is
characterized by its category kj and its location lj on the unit interval, (kj, lj) ∈ [0, 1]×
{0, 1}. The buyers’ valuation of a product at the ideal location in the preferred category
equals v. If a buyer likes category k and is located at xk (with (k, xk) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1]), her
utility from buying one unit of seller j’s product in this product category is v−t|xk−lj|−plj
where t > 0 captures the degree of product differentiation. Her utility is zero for products
in all categories that are not equal to k. Price competition among Hotelling duopolists
leads to equilibrium prices c+t and equilibrium profits pid = t/2 per unit mass of buyers.19
A monopoly seller sets price pm = (v+ c)/2, and its profit is pim = (v− c)2/(4t) per unit
mass of buyers if the market is not fully covered. This is the case if t ≥ (v− c)/2. In this
parameter range, pm ≤ pd. For t < (v − c)/2, there is full coverage, and the monopolist
sets pm = v − t. Its profit is pim = v − t− c.
In the Hotelling model, the ratio pid/pim is given by
√
2t/(v − c) if (v − c)/2 ≤ t ≤
2(v − c)/3 and by t/[2(v − t − c)] if t < (v − c)/2. It follows that pid/pim ≥ 1/2 for
t ≥ (v− c)/2, and vice versa. That is, if products are sufficiently differentiated, twice the
duopoly profit is larger than the monopoly profit.
Example 2: Price competition with a representative consumer with linear demand and
17Other representative consumer models—for instance, with CES or logit demand—would work as
well.
18Another micro-foundation that we do not develop here but that also fits our assumptions are models
of sequential product search (e.g., Wolinsky, 1986, and Anderson and Renault, 1999).
19The upper bound on t is 2(v − c)/3, as the buyer who is indifferent between both sellers would not
obtain a positive utility otherwise.
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differentiated products.
Suppose that buyers with the same preferred category have an indirect utility function
of q1 + q2 − 1/2(q21 + q22) − γq1q2 − p1q1 − p2q2, with γ ∈ [0, 1] expressing the degree of
substitutability between products. This is a representative consumer setting in which each
buyer obtains utility from positive quantities of each product in her preferred category.
Maximizing this utility function with respect to q1 and q2, we obtain the indirect demand
functions pi = 1 − qi − γq−i, i = 1, 2. Inverting this demand system yields the direct
demand functions qi = (β − γ − pi + γp−i)/(1− γ2), for i = 1, 2.
Duopoly equilibrium profit per buyer is pid = [(1− γ)(1− c)2]/[(1 + γ)(2− γ)2]. For a
monopolist, the direct demand is qi = 1− pi and the per-buyer profit is pim = (1− c)2/4.
Thus, the ratio pid/pim is given by
4(1− γ)
(1 + γ)(2− γ)2 ,
which is above 1/2 if γ is lower than approximately 0.62.
Example 3: Thin markets.
In this example, we consider capacity-constrained sellers that each can offer only one unit
of a product—the analysis can be extended to allow for sellers with a finite number of
products to sell. Real-world applications include the housing and rental market, and the
market for collectibles in which owners often have only one unit to sell.
Suppose that, in each category, there are two sellers and finitely many buyers MB > 1.
The example differs from the baseline model, as there is no continuum of buyers. To keep
the exposition simple, suppose that there are two buyer types with valuation R ∈ {R,R},
with 0 ≤ R < R. The ratio of R-types is ρ ∈ (0, 1). Sellers observe buyers’ valuations at
the price-setting stage.20
Consider, first, the case in which both sellers and all buyers are located on platform i.
If, for example, there are MB = 2 buyers on platform i, there are four pairs of willingness-
to-pay that the sellers can encounter: (R,R), (R,R), (R,R) and (R,R). For any pair with
fewer R-type buyers than sellers, the unique equilibrium is that sellers set p∗ = R because
of Bertrand competition. Only if there are at least as many R-type buyers as sellers—i.e
(R,R) realizes—there is the unique equilibrium that sellers set p∗ = R. The probability
of this event equals ρ2. The expected profit of each seller is then pi(2, 2) = ρ2R+(1−ρ2)R.
More generally, denoting the probability that the number of high-type buyers is larger
20This simplifying assumption implies that sellers can observe whether or not they are located in a
market with sufficiently many R-type buyers when they set their prices. Yet, in general, it suffices for
our argument that prices are increasing in the number of buyers.
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than the number of sellers (i.e., Pr{]{Rl=R}MBl=1 ≥ 2}), by Q(MB, 2), we obtain
Q(MB, 2) =
MB∑
k=2
(
MB
k
)
ρk(1− ρ)MB−k.
The expected profit can then be written as pi(MB, 2) = Q(MB, 2)R + (1 − Q(MB, 2))R,
which corresponds to pid of the baseline model.
If, instead, one seller per category locates on platform A and the other on platform B,
and each buyer joins with probability 1/2 platform A and with probability 1/2 platform
B (which will happen in equilibrium), the expected profit of a seller on platform i is
pi(l, 1) = Q(l, 1)R + (1 − Q(l, 1))R if l ∈ {1, ...,MB} buyers join platform i, as q(l, 1)
is the probability that there is at least one R-type buyer among the l buyers. The
probability that l ∈ {1, ...,MB} buyers locate on platform i is given by
P (l) =
(
MB
l
)(
1
2
)l(
1
2
)MB−l
.
Overall, the expected profit of a single seller located on a platform can then be written as∑MB
l=1 P (l)pi(l, 1). This expression corresponds to pi
m/2—that is, the monopoly profit of
a seller when reaching each buyer with probability 1/2. Table 2 illustrates how the ratio
pid/pim depends on the number of buyers per category. (Note that pid and pim depend on
the number of buyers MB.)
MB 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
pid/pim 0 0.1333 0.2367 0.3162 0.3769 0.4228 0.4570 0.4821 0.5002 0.5129
The ratio pid/pim as a function of the number of buyers MB per category and parameter values ρ = 1/4,
R = 0 and R = 1.
Table 2: Thin Markets
Example 4: Linear Cournot competition with fixed costs per buyer.
Consider a Cournot model with linear inverse demand p(q1 + q2) = α − β(qi + q−i) and
constant marginal costs c > 0, with α > c, β > 0, and i = 1, 2. In addition to their
marginal cost, sellers incur a fixed cost F > 0 per buyer. The duopoly equilibrium profit
per buyer is pid = max{(α − c)2/(9β) − F, 0}. For a monopolist, the inverse demand is
p(qm) = α−βqm, and the monopoly profit per buyer is pim = max{(α− c)2/(4β)−F, 0}.
If both profits are strictly positive, the ratio pid/pim is
4 [(α− c)2 − 9βF ]
9 [(α− c)2 − 4βF ] ,
which is always less than 1/2.
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3 Segmentation versus Agglomeration
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium of the 4-stage game. In particular, we
provide conditions for segmentation or agglomeration to be an equilibrium outcome.
In Section 2.2, we analyzed stages 3 and 4. We now turn to the location decisions of
buyers and sellers in stage 2. Here, multiple Nash equilibria may exist, given the listing
fees set by platforms in the first stage. We first determine the set of Nash equilibria in
stage 2. We then explain how our equilibrium selection criteria ensure a unique prediction.
A detailed analysis is provided in Appendix A.
Suppose, for example, that listing fees fA and fB are close to zero. Then, it is a Nash
equilibrium that all sellers and all buyers are active on only one platform. In such an
agglomeration equilibrium on platform i, a seller’s profit is pid−fi and a buyer’s utility is
V d. In addition to two such agglomeration equilibria, there is also a segmentation equi-
librium, in which the sellers in each category locate on different platforms, and half of the
buyers are active on platform A and the other half on platform B. Under segmentation,
the profit of a seller joining platform i is pim/2− fi, whereas the utility of a buyer is V m.
If, instead, both platforms’ listing fees were higher than max{pid, pim/2}, sellers would
make losses in an agglomeration and a segmentation equilibrium. In this case, as long as
each platform charges a fee below pim, there exist two equilibria in which only one seller
is active in each category, either on platform A or on platform B, and all buyers use this
platform. We call an equilibrium of this type stand-alone equilibrium.
-
6
-
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Figure 1: Possible equilibrium configurations at stage 2 : pid/pim < 1/2 on the
left-hand side and pid/pim ≥ 1/2 on the right-hand side
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The set of Nash equilibria is visualized in Figure 1—we focus on the relevant case
{fA ≤ pim, fB ≤ pim} because a fee above pim leads to zero demand and, in equilibrium
of the full game, no platform will set such a fee. The left panel of the figure displays
the case pid/pim < 1/2, whereas the right panel displays the opposite case. In the figure,
the agglomeration equilibrium on platform i is denoted by AGGi (and by AGGAB if
an agglomeration equilibrium on either platform exists); the stand-alone equilibrium is
denoted by STAi; and the segmentation equilibrium is denoted by SEG. As can be seen
in the left panel, there are regions in which three equilibrium configurations coexist.
We turn to the equilibrium selection accomplished through our refinement, illustrated
in Figure 2. First, applying the concept of coalition-proofness eliminates the multiplicity
of agglomeration equilibria off the diagonal. The reason is that a coalition of sellers
and buyers will always choose to be active on the platform with the lower fee. The same
reasoning holds if there is a multiplicity of stand-alone equilibria, and if an agglomeration
and a stand-alone equilibrium co-exist.
-
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fB
fA
fB
pim
2
pid
pim
2
pid
STAB
STAA
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AGGA
SEG
pim
2
pid
pim
2
pid STAB
STAA
AGGB
AGGA
Figure 2: Selected equilibrium configurations at stage 2: pid/pim < 1/2 on the
left-hand side and pid/pim ≥ 1/2 on the right-hand side
Second, the joint use of coalition-proofness and profit-dominance of sellers also singles
out a unique equilibrium type for regions in which the segmentation equilibrium exists
together with another type of equilibrium.21 To understand this result, consider, again,
the case in which the listing fees of both platforms are close to zero. For pid/pim ≥ 1/2, the
segmentation equilibrium is then not stable to the deviation of a coalition of sellers and
buyers who are active on the platform with the higher fee. If this coalition switches to
the rival platform, buyers are better off because they observe the offers of all sellers, and
sellers are also (weakly) better off because they now serve all buyers instead of only half of
21In Appendix A, we show that the two refinements are never in conflict with each other.
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them. This is profitable because pid ≥ pim/2. Since no subcoalition can gain from further
deviation, all segmentation equilibria are eliminated when pid/pim ≥ 1/2, as can be seen
in the right panel of Figure 2. By contrast, if pid/pim < 1/2, the coalition-proof refinement
has no bite, as the deviation is no longer profitable for sellers. Using seller dominance,
however, now singles out a unique equilibrium. In particular, if fi < pi
m/2 − pid + f−i,
segmentation is more profitable than agglomeration for sellers. This is displayed in the
left panel of Figure 2, which shows that segmentation is the unique equilibrium if fi and
f−i are relatively close to each other (and lower than pim/2).
We turn to platform pricing in the first stage. Although platforms are homogeneous,
the Bertrand logic does not necessarily apply in our situation. The reason is that sellers
may benefit from segmentation, which implies that a platform does not necessarily attract
all sellers and buyers when undercutting the rival’s fee. The next four propositions
characterize the equilibrium listing fees for all parameter ranges and provide precise
conditions for platforms to sustain positive fees.
If the ratio of duopoly to monopoly profits is large (i.e., pid/pim ≥ 1/2), agglomera-
tion occurs—we do not select between the two payoff-equivalent agglomeration equilibria.
From a seller’s point of view, the effect that agglomeration reduces profits due to com-
petition is dominated by the demand expansion effect that all buyers (instead of only
half of them) observe the seller’s offer. Since each platform receives the entire demand by
setting a fee lower than its rival’s, platforms “play hard” and fight fiercely to become dom-
inant. Thus, in this region, the standard Bertrand argument applies, and homogeneous
platforms charge fees equal to marginal cost in equilibrium.
Proposition 1. Agglomeration. If pid/pim ≥ 1/2, in equilibrium, the listing fees are
f ?A = f
?
B = 0, and platforms’ profits are Π
?
A = Π
?
B = 0.
By contrast, if the ratio of duopoly to monopoly profits is small (i.e., pid ≤ 1/4pim),
segmentation occurs. Sellers avoid competition by choosing to locate on different plat-
forms, which, in turn, is exploited by platforms. To see this, suppose that both platforms
charge a fee of zero. If pid is lower than pim/2, sellers choose to segment. But then a
platform can raise its fee slightly without reducing its demand. Thus, the platform with
the higher fee remains active and raises strictly positive profits.
Proposition 2. Segmentation. If pid/pim ≤ 1/4, in the unique equilibrium, the listing
fees are f ?A = f
?
B = pi
m/2, and platform profits’ are Π?A = Π
?
B = pi
m/2.
The proposition shows that platforms not only obtain a strictly positive profit, but
even extract the entire surplus from sellers. The argument is as follows. If a platform
deviates from the equilibrium listing fee f ?i = pi
m/2 to a listing fee slightly below pid,
this induces sellers and buyers to agglomerate on the deviating platform. The deviant
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platform then obtains a profit of 2pid. Instead, the equilibrium profit is pim/2, which is
larger than 2pid if pid/pim ≤ 1/4. Hence, no platform has an incentive to deviate from the
listing fee pim/2—platforms “play soft” and do not fight for the dominant position. To
sum up, if competition between sellers is sufficiently intense, platforms obtain positive
profits by inducing sellers to segment the market. Interestingly, fierce competition among
sellers enables platforms to sustain high profits in equilibrium.
In the intermediate range 1/4 < pid/pim < 1/2, platforms randomize over listing fees.
The intuition for the non-existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium in this range is as
follows: For any fee set by platform i, platform −i’s best response is to either set a fee
that is lower by a discrete amount to induce agglomeration or to set a fee that is higher
by a discrete amount leading to segmentation. This creates a cycle in best responses.
Suppose that platform i sets a relatively high fee. Platform −i’s best response is then
to set a lower fee, so as to just induce agglomeration. The best response of platform i is
to lower its fee slightly and induce segmentation again. This sequence of best responses
continues until the fee of platform i reaches such a low level that platform −i, instead of
setting a lower fee, prefers to set a fee higher than that of platform i, so as to just induce
segmentation. In turn, platform i’s best response is to reduce its fee slightly to induce
agglomeration, and so on. Therefore, the sequence continues and does not converge.
The logic behind the mixed-strategy equilibrium in the range 1/4 < pid/pim < 1/2
is reminiscent of, but distinct from, Bertrand-Edgeworth cycles. In the latter, the best-
response dynamic involves a marginal undercutting of the rival’s fee, as long fees are
sufficiently high (see, for example, Edgeworth, 1925; Maskin and Tirole, 1988). By
contrast, in our model, for any fee charged by the rival, the best response is to set a fee
that is higher or lower by a discrete amount.22 In fact, the range of subscription fees
over which platforms mix can be divided into two intervals, a lower and an upper one. In
the lower interval, fees are set with the intention to induce agglomeration. In the upper
interval, fees are set with the intention to induce segmentation. This leads to mass points
in the mixing distribution and potentially disjoint mixing sets.
In the region of 3/8 ≤ pid/pim < 1/2, the upper bound of the lower interval in which
a platform aims to induce agglomeration coincides with the lower bound of the upper
interval in which a platform aims to induce segmentation. This implies that platforms
randomize over a convex set.
Proposition 3. Probabilistic segmentation and agglomeration with listing fees chosen
from a convex set. If 3/8 ≤ pid/pim < 1/2, there is a unique mixed-strategy equilibrium, in
which platforms set fees in the domain fi ∈ [pim−2pid, 2pim−4pid]. The mixing probability
22In this respect, our equilibrium also differs from those found in papers in the search literature, such
as Varian (1980) or Janssen and Moraga-Gonza´lez (2004).
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is characterized by the cumulative distribution function
G1(f) =
{
f−(pim−2pid)
f+1/2(pim−2pid) , if f ∈ [pim − 2pid, 3/2pim − 3pid);
2f−5/2(pim−2pid)
f−1/2(pim−2pid) , if f ∈ [3/2pim − 3pid, 2pim − 4pid],
with a mass point at f = 3/2pim−3pid, which is chosen with probability 1/4. The expected
profit is Π?A = Π
?
B = 3pi
m/2− 3pid.
The cumulative distribution function G1(f) is illustrated in Figure 3. The mass point
is at the fee that separates the two intervals. Therefore, setting such a fee induces
segmentation with probability (almost) 1. Since the event that both platforms choose
this fee occurs with strictly positive probability, the expected equilibrium profit in this
regime must equal 3/2pim − 3pid.
1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0
f
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
G1(f)
Figure 3: First mixed-strategy equilibrium: Cumulative distribution
function with parameters pim = 5 and pid = 2.
The highest fee that platforms can charge to obtain positive demand is pim/2. If
pid/pim is at the lower bound of the mixing region of Proposition 3 (i.e., pid/pim = 3/8),
the highest fee in the mixing range, 2pim−4pid, reaches this level. It follows that if pid/pim
is lower, the equilibrium will be different. In particular, as a fee of pim/2 must be the
upper bound, probability mass will be shifted to this point, and the distribution will
entail a mass point at the highest fee. In addition, the best response to this highest fee
(i.e., the largest fee in the lower interval) no longer coincides with the fee that induces
segmentation with probability (almost) 1. The latter fee is the lowest one in the upper
interval, which implies that the support of the mixing region becomes non-convex. This
is shown in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. Probabilistic segmentation and agglomeration with listing fees chosen
from a non-convex set. If 1/4 < pid/pim < 3/8, there is a unique mixed-strategy equilib-
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rium, in which platforms set fees in the domain fi ∈ [pim/4, pid) ∪ [3pim/4 − pid, pim/2].
The mixing probability is characterized by the cumulative distribution function
G2(f) =

f−1/4pim
f+1/2(pim−2pid) , if f ∈ [pim/4, pid);
2f−1/4pim−3/2(pim−2pid)
f−1/2(pim−2pid) , if f ∈ [3pim/4− pid, pim/2);
1, if f = pim/2;
with two mass points, one at the highest fee in the support f = pim/2, which is chosen
with probability (2pid−1/2pim)/pim, and the other at the lower bound of the upper interval
f = 3pim/4− pid, which is chosen with probability (3/4pim − 2pid)/pid. The expected profit
is Π?A = Π
?
B = 3pi
m/4− pid.
Figure 4 illustratesG2(f) in the second mixing regime. The support of the distribution
is [5/4, 7/4) ∪ [2, 5/2]. The intuition for the lower mass point (at f = 3pim/4 − pid) is
the same as the one given in the first mixed regime. The intuition for the mass point at
f = pim/2 is, as explained above, that pim/2 is an upper bound in any mixing equilibrium.
1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4
f
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
G2(f)
Figure 4: Second mixed-strategy equilibrium: Cumulative distribution
function with parameters pim = 5 and pid = 7/4.
As can be seen from Proposition 4, the gap between the two intervals widens as
pid falls. In the limit, as pid → pim/4, all probability mass is on pim/2. Therefore, the
equilibrium is continuous. As pid falls, expected fees rise continuously, as do platforms’
profits. The expected equilibrium platform profit is a continuous function but has three
kinks at the boundary points of the regions (see Figure 5).
From the analysis, it is easy to see that the assumption of buyers splitting evenly on
platforms when being indifferent is not crucial for the results. If this split is more in favor
of platform i, the pure-strategy segmentation equilibrium exists for a smaller range: as
this equilibrium is less attractive for platform −i, the platform has a stronger deviation
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Figure 5: Expected platform profit Π?j as a function of pi
d.
incentive. However, if pid is sufficiently small, deviation is not profitable for platform −i
because the platform can obtain only a low profit with agglomeration. Therefore, an
asymmetric segmentation equilibrium still occurs.
Evaluating the different equilibrium regions from a welfare perspective includes buy-
ers’ utilities. There are two reasons that the segmentation equilibrium is less efficient
than an agglomeration equilibrium. First, because buyers are not informed about all of-
fers, they may buy products with a greater mismatch cost than when they are informed
about all offers. Second, if pm > pd, the inefficiency in the product market due to market
power of sellers is higher, implying that the quantities bought by buyers in a segmenta-
tion equilibrium are lower than in an agglomeration equilibrium. By contrast, platforms
enjoy profits when they induce segmentation with positive probability, and the resulting
market structure is inefficient. In Section 6, we discuss some policy implications that
arise from our analysis.
Examples. We express the equilibrium regions in terms of the underlying parameters
describing seller competition in the examples laid out in the previous section. In Example
1, which features price competition and Hotelling demand, a larger degree of product
differentiation t increases the sufficient statistic pid/pim. We obtain that the agglomeration
region applies for 2(v − c)/3 ≥ t ≥ (v − c)/2, the first mixing region if (v − c)/2 > t ≥
3(v− c)/7, the second mixing region if 3(v− c)/7 > t > (v− c)/3, and the segmentation
region if t ≤ (v − c)/3.
In Example 2, which features price competition and a representative consumer, the
boundaries of the regions are affected by γ ∈ [0, β), with a higher γ implying less differ-
entiation and fiercer competition. The agglomeration region applies approximately for
γ ≤ 0.62β, the first mixing region for 0.62β < γ ≤ 0.74β, the second mixing region for
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0.74β < γ < 0.85β, and the segmentation region for γ ≥ 0.85β.
In Example 3, which features thin markets, the number of buyers and the probability
for a buyer being of high valuation are the drivers for the platform market structure.
With two buyers and R = 0, agglomeration occurs if the probability of high-type buyers
is ρ ≥ 4/5, whereas segmentation occurs if ρ ≤ 4/9. A larger probability for the high type
reduces competition, as it is more likely that both sellers face a high-type buyer, which
leads to an increase in pid. Regarding the number of buyers, in our numerical example
with ρ = 1/4 and R = 0, agglomeration occurs when there are more than eight buyers (cf.
Table 2), whereas segmentation occurs for three or less buyers. The first mixing region
prevails for five to eight buyers and the second mixing region for four buyers. When the
probability of the high type decreases, the boundaries for all regions shift upward, which
implies that segmentation becomes more likely.
In Example 4, which features Cournot competition and fixed costs per buyer F , a
higher F favors segmentation, as a seller serves a smaller mass of buyers in this config-
uration. Accordingly, we obtain that the segmentation region applies if (a − c)2/(4b) >
F ≥ 7(a − c)2/(108b)—that is, if fixed costs are sufficiently high (but lower than pim).
The second mixing region applies for (a − c)2/(36b) < F < 7(a − c)2/(108b), the first
mixing region for 0 ≤ F ≤ (a − c)2/(36b), and the agglomeration region does not exist
(due to the fact that pid/pim < 1/2).
Finally, we note that, as has been demonstrated in the example with thin markets,
our results do not rely on a constant per-buyer profit. If this profit was not constant, the
equilibrium characterization would be more involved, as the boundaries of the regions
then depend on the mass of buyers on each platform in addition to the profit per buyer.
However, under standard regularity assumptions on demand, the qualitative results are
the same as in our analysis.
4 Multi-Homing
In the baseline model, we focus on the case in which both buyers and sellers are single-
homing. In this section, we consider multi-homing of either buyers or sellers. We will
show that in both cases, our qualitative results remain.
4.1 Multi-Homing of Buyers
Assume that a fraction α ∈ [0, 1] of buyers joins both platforms. A natural reason is that
buyers incur time cost to be active on a second platform, and they are heterogeneous
with respect to these time costs. Therefore, only buyers with sufficiently low time costs
are active on both platforms. A higher α can then be interpreted as a reduction in time
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costs.23
Multi-homing of buyers affects the sellers’ profits. In fact, a seller will never obtain
the monopoly profit because a fraction α of buyers is informed about both offers. In a
segmentation equilibrium, half of the single-homing buyers are active on platform A and
the other half on platform B. Because there is a mass 1−α of single-homing buyers, each
platform has a total buyer mass of (1 + α)/2, out of which (1 − α)/2 are single-homers
and α are multi-homers. As sellers do not know which buyer single-homes and which
one multi-homes, they set a single price in the product market. The equilibrium price
will depend on α because multi-homers’ demand may differ from single-homers’ demand.
Therefore, we can write the expected profit that a seller obtains from a buyer as pi(α).
In particular, pi(0) = pim and pi(1) = pid. Naturally, pi′(α) ≤ 0, which implies that for
all α ∈ [0, 1], pi(α) ∈ [pid, pim].24 Below, we will show how a change in α plays out in
Example 1. The equilibrium with multi-homing buyers is characterized by the following
proposition.
Proposition 5. All results of Propositions 1 through 4 carry over to the case of buyer
multi-homing, after replacing pim/2 by
pi(α)
1 + α
2
.
The proposition shows that the qualitative results of the previous section remain valid
if buyers can multi-home. Although segmentation does not give sellers monopoly power,
it nevertheless lowers the competitive pressure because some buyers are still informed
only about one seller’s offer, and platforms will exploit this.
The question arises: Do platforms benefit from buyer multi-homing? If we are in
the range of the agglomeration equilibrium, nothing changes compared to buyer single-
homing because platforms are engaged in Bertrand competition. However, this is not true
for the regions in which the segmentation equilibrium occurs with positive probability.
There are two countervailing forces. First, platforms have more buyers, which leads to a
larger demand per seller. In fact, instead of serving a buyer mass of 1/2 (as with single-
homing), platforms now have a mass of (1 + α)/2 of buyers. This allows platforms to
charge higher listing fees. However, the countervailing force is that sellers make smaller
profits in the product market because some buyers are informed about both offers. The
per-buyer profit is then pi(α) < pim. It follows that platforms are hurt by the possibility
of buyer multi-homing if the competition effect dominates the demand-enhancing effect.
23For example, if a distribution of time costs among buyers first-order stochastically dominates another
one, the latter distribution leads to a higher fraction α of multi-homing buyers.
24In an agglomeration equilibrium, a seller’s profit is unchanged since all buyers see both offers. This
leads to a profit of pid for each seller.
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We illustrate this result with the help of Example 1. With Hotelling demand, we
obtain
pi(α)
1 + α
2
=

(αt+(v−c)(1−α))2
2t(2−α)2 if t ≥ v−c2
v−c−t
2
if α(v−c)
1+α
≤ t < v−c
2
t
2α
if t < α(v−c)
1+α
Comparing pi(α)(1 + α)/2 with pim/2, the former is larger than the latter for high t,
but the reverse holds true for low t. In particular, for t ≥ (v−c)/2, the demand-enhancing
effect of multi-homing prevails, as product market competition is not particularly fierce.
However, in this region, pid is larger than pi(α)(1 + α)/2, which implies that platforms
in equilibrium still set fees equal to zero and an agglomeration equilibrium emerges.
Therefore, although the effect of increased demand dominates, this does not affect the
outcome. If, instead, t is small (i.e., t < α(v − c)/(1 + α)), multi-homing lowers sellers’
segmentation profit, as competition is fierce, and, therefore, lowers the listing fees that
platforms charge in equilibrium. This effect is also dominant in the intermediate region,
implying that platforms obtain weakly lower profits with buyer multi-homing.
Finally, we observe that in a segmentation equilibrium multi-homing consumers exert
a positive externality on single-homing ones. As product prices are lower with more
multi-homing consumers, single-homers benefit as well. This implies that devices which
foster multi-homing, such as metasearch engines, also benefit consumers who do not use
them.
4.2 Multi-Homing of Sellers
In this section, we consider the effects of multi-homing of sellers. We focus on a situation
with uniform pricing, that is, a multi-homing seller sets the same price on both platforms.
Towards the end of the section, we show that the analysis with price discrimination is a
special case of that with uniform pricing and our main insight is robust.
In contrast to buyers, sellers need to pay for being active on a platform. Therefore,
even without any exogenous costs for using a second platform, sellers do not necessarily
find it profitable to multi-home.25 We are particularly interested to understand the
conditions under which seller multi-homing affects the platform market structure and
whether platforms benefit. This focus is different from the literature on two-sided pricing
in two-sided markets, which has investigated the effect of seller multi-homing on the price
structure, pointing out that that platforms exert monopoly power on the multi-homing
side (see, e.g., Armstrong, 2006, or Hagiu, 2006). In that literature, the platform market
structure is given.
25Introducing such listing costs would not change the main result.
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With multi-homing sellers, new potential equilibrium configurations in the second
stage may occur. First, both sellers in a category may multi-home. In that case, all
buyers are exposed to both offers, implying that each seller receives the duopoly profit
pid per buyer. But the profit per buyer is then equivalent to the profit when both sell-
ers agglomerate on one platform. In the latter case, however, sellers have to pay only
one listing fee. Therefore, the configuration in which both sellers multi-home is never
coalition-proof and will not occur in equilibrium under our refinement.
Second, a configuration is possible in which one seller in a category single-homes and
the other one multi-homes—a situation we refer to as partial multi-homing. If in one
half of the categories, the single-homing seller is on platform A and in the other half on
platform B, buyers are indifferent between both platforms, as the same number of sellers
are active on either platform. Buyers are, therefore, willing to split evenly between the
platforms. In this situation, competition in the product market is asymmetric. Half of
buyers are active on the platform in which only the multi-homing seller is present and
observe only the offer of this seller. The other half observes the offers of both sellers.
Let us denote the per-buyer profit of the multi-homing seller by piMH and that of the
single-homing seller by piSH . As the multi-homing seller can act as a monopolist to one
half of the buyers but faces competition for the other half, its price pMH will be between
pm and pd. The same holds for the price of the single-homing seller pSH , as this seller
faces competition from a rival who has some ’captive’ buyers and will, therefore, price
higher than in duopoly competition. For the sellers’ profits, we assume that
pid ≤ piSH ≤ piMH ≤ pim,
which follows from the sellers’ pricing decisions. These relations are compatible with our
specific examples.
We can now establish the equilibrium with multi-homing sellers.
Proposition 6. • For pid/pim ≥ 1/2 and pid/pim ≤ 1/4, the equilibrium is the same
as the one characterized in Propositions 1 and 2, respectively.
• For 3/8 ≤ pid/pim < 1/2, the equilibrium is the same as the one characterized in
Proposition 3 if piMH ≤ 3/2pim − 2pid.
Similarly, for 1/4 < pid/pim < 3/8, the equilibrium is the same as the one charac-
terized in Proposition 4 if piMH ≤ 3/4pim.
• Instead, for (i) 3/8 ≤ pid/pim < 1/2 and piMH > 3/2pim − 2pid and for (ii) 1/4 <
pid/pim < 3/8 and piMH > 3/4pim, respectively, in equilibrium, platforms set fees of
f ?A = f
?
B = 0, and sellers play an agglomeration equilibrium if pi
d > piSH/2 and a
partial multi-homing equilibrium if pid ≤ piSH/2.
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The proposition shows that for some parameter constellations, the equilibrium derived
in Propositions 1 to 4 remains unchanged. Foremost, if competition between sellers is
relatively fierce, the segmentation equilibrium still exists. Although sellers can multi-
home, doing so would reduce their profits by too large an amount; hence, they prefer
segmentation. Platforms exploit this by extracting the entire seller surplus. Therefore,
our insight that segmentation leads to high platform profits, even though platforms are
homogeneous, is robust to seller multi-homing.
The proposition also shows that the mixed-strategy equilibrium, which involves seg-
mentation with some probability and features positive platform profits, emerges for a
smaller parameter range than in the case of single-homing sellers. It is replaced by an
equilibrium in which platforms charge zero listing fees. Thus, we obtain the unambiguous
result that platforms set (weakly) lower fees to sellers and earn (weakly) lower profits
if the latter can multi-home instead of single-home. This contrasts with the results of
the existing literature on two-sided markets, which finds that platforms exert monopoly
power on the seller side and, in equilibrium, may set higher fees to sellers and earn higher
profits under seller multi-homing.
The intuition behind our result is as follows: If sellers can multi-home, segmentation
may break down because sellers have an additional deviation possibility from the seg-
mentation equilibrium. Instead of being active only on the other platform, they can now
join both platforms. This deviation is particularly profitable if piMH is large. In fact, as
can be seen in the proposition, segmentation is more likely to break down if piMH is high.
As a result, platforms can no longer charge high fees and exploit the possibility that they
grant monopoly power to sellers. The homogeneity of the platforms then drives fees and
profits down to zero.
Interestingly, this also implies that agglomeration is more likely if sellers can multi-
home. The general notion in the antitrust economics of platform markets is that multi-
homing reduces the risk of market tipping because it is more likely that multiple platforms
will obtain positive demand (see, e.g., Evans and Schmalensee, 2007).26 In our model,
a different mechanism is at work—that is, the possibility of multi-homing can break the
segmentation equilibrium in which multiple platforms are active.
In addition, (partial) multi-homing occurs in equilibrium under some conditions.27
In particular, if piSH and piMH are relatively large, neither the single-homing nor the
multi-homing seller has an incentive to deviate to an agglomeration or a segmentation
equilibrium. The partial multi-homing equilibrium is in between pure agglomeration and
26The German Federal Cartel Office used a similar argument in the clearing of a merger in the housing
platform market (Bundeskartellamt, 2016).
27Partial multi-homing of sellers can often be observed on price comparison websites. Whereas some
sellers list their offers on several platforms at the same time, others use only one.
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pure segmentation and consists of elements of both equilibria. While buyers segment,
half of them are still informed about both offers due to the multi-homing of one seller in
each category. In contrast to the pure segmentation equilibrium, platforms cannot exploit
this in equilibrium. As stated in the proposition, the partial multi-homing equilibrium
leads to zero fees for platforms. The intuition is similar to the one developed for the
agglomeration equilibrium: When slightly undercutting the listing fee of the rival, a
platform can get the single-homing seller in each category (and not only in one half of
the categories). This leads to an agglomeration equilibrium on the platform with the
lower fee, which gives this platform an upward jump in demand, and is, therefore, always
profitable. Hence, the standard Bertrand logic applies and drives fees to marginal cost.
We illustrate the result with Example 1. For Hotelling demand, piMH and piSH are
piMH =
(t+ v − c)(8t− (v − c))
8t
and piSH =
(v − c)2
8t
in the relevant region. Determining the critical value of the transportation costs so
that condition (i) of the third part of Proposition 6 is fulfilled, we obtain that this
holds if (v − c)/2 ≥ t > (3 + √57)(v − c)/24 ≈ 0.44(v − c). Condition (ii) is never
fulfilled. As a result, we find that with single-homing of sellers, the mixing region was
valid for (v − c)/2 ≥ t > (v − c)/3, whereas with multi-homing, it shrinks to the range
0.44(v − c) ≥ t > (v − c)/3. In addition, the condition pid < piSH/2 is not satisfied
with Hotelling demand in the relevant range. This implies that a partial multi-homing
equilibrium does not exist. If fees are zero, an agglomeration equilibrium will always
emerge.28
We assumed that a multi-homing seller sets the same price on each platform. If price
discrimination were possible, the seller would set pd on the platform where the rival is
also present and pm on the platform where the seller is in a monopoly position. Using
the notation above, this implies that piMH = 1/2(pid + pim) and piSH = pid. Therefore,
the situation with price discrimination can be analyzed as a special case of the situation
analyzed above. It is easy to see that the qualitative results of Proposition 6 still hold.
Finally, we note that although we analyzed multi-homing of buyers and sellers sepa-
rately, a combination of the two will lead to similar insights. In particular, if competition
between sellers is fierce, there is always the incentive to segment the market. This will
drive sellers away from agglomeration to full or partial segmentation.
28The non-existence of the partial multi-homing equilibrium is an artifact of the Hotelling model.
With general demand and in some of our other examples, such an equilibrium exists.
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5 Generalizations and Robustness
To convey the main results and the intuitions in the clearest way, in the baseline model,
we made some simplifying assumptions about, for example, the platforms’ pricing instru-
ments and the number of platforms and sellers. In this section, we generalize the baseline
model by considering alternative pricing instruments on the seller side (Section 5.1) and
a general number of platforms and sellers (Section 5.2). We show that our results are
robust to these extensions. In addition, we also briefly discuss the alternative selection
criterion of the buyer-preferred equilibrium (Section 5.3), the case of two-sided pricing
(Section 5.4), and some further extensions (Section 5.5).
5.1 Platform Pricing Instruments
In the main model, we consider the case in which platforms charge listing fees to sellers.
This pricing instrument is the only feasible one if platforms cannot monitor the transac-
tion between buyers and sellers, as is often the case, e.g., in housing markets. However,
in other markets, such as the hotel booking industry, monitoring is possible at relatively
low costs. As a consequence, booking services or marketplaces, such as Amazon market-
place, often charge per-transaction fees or a percentage of the price charged by sellers
(revenue-sharing). In this section, we consider these two pricing instruments, as well as
the combination of listing fee and per-transaction fee.
5.1.1 Per-transaction fees
Suppose that the game is the same as the one laid out in Section 2 but that platforms
instead of charging listing fees demand a fee per transaction, denoted by φi, i = A,B.
That is, every time a consumer buys a product from a seller, the seller needs to pay φi
to the platform. A listing fee constitutes a fixed cost for the seller and, therefore, does
not affect the pricing choice in the product market. By contrast, a per-transaction fee
increases the marginal cost of each seller, and will affect the price that the seller charges.
We denote the resulting duopoly equilibrium price in the product market by pd(φi),
with ∂pd(φi)/∂φi > 0, and the associated demand by D
d(φi). The resulting duopoly
profit (assuming a constant marginal cost of c) is pid(φi) = D
d(φi)(p
d(φi)− φi − c), with
∂pid(φi)/∂φi ≤ 0.29 Similarly, in the monopoly case, the resulting price is pm(φi), with
∂pm(φi)/∂φi ≤ 0,30 the demand is Dm(φi), and the profit is pim(φi) = Dm(φi)(pm(φi) −
29The inequality in ∂pid(φi)/∂φi is only weak because in covered markets (as, for example, in the
Hotelling model), an increase in φi leads to an increase in the product price by the same amount without
affecting equilibrium demand, implying that profits are unchanged.
30The weak inequality here is due to the fact that in markets with rectangular demand, the monopoly
price is independent of cost.
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φi − c), with ∂pim(φi)/∂φi ≤ 0. We maintain the assumption from the main model that
pid(φi)/pi
m(φi) ≤ 1 for all i.
In addition, we assume that an increase in the per-transaction fee reduces the monopoly
profit by more than the duopoly profit, and the same holds true for the monopoly demand
compared to duopoly demand; that is,
∂pim(φi)
∂φi
≤ ∂pi
d(φi)
∂φi
≤ 0 and ∂D
m(φi)
∂φi
≤ ∂D
d(φi)
∂φi
≤ 0.
These properties hold in standard oligopoly models, including those in our examples.
We can then solve the model as in the case with listing fees. The details are provided
in the proof of Proposition 7 in the Appendix. As we demonstrate there, also with per-
transaction fees, our selection criterion singles out a unique type of equilibrium in stage
2. Turning to the full game, with per-transaction fees, platforms cannot extract the full
profit from sellers. However, we can formulate the analogue to a listing fee of pim/2,
which is the highest profit a platform can make in a segmentation equilibrium. With
per-transaction fees, we denote by φm ≡ arg maxφi φiDm(φi)/2. We obtain the following
result:
Proposition 7. If pid(0)/pim(0) ≥ 1/2, in equilibrium, both platforms set φ?A = φ?B = 0,
and buyers and sellers agglomerate on either platform A or platform B. If pid(0)/pim(0) <
1/2 and
φ′Dd(φ′)
φmDm(φm)
≤ 1
4
,
where φ′ is defined by pid(φ′) = pim(φm)/2, in the unique equilibrium, both platforms set
φ?A = φ
?
B = φ
m, and buyers and sellers segment. If pid(0)/pim(0) < 1/2 and
φ′Dd(φ′)
φmDm(φm)
>
1
4
,
there is a unique mixed-strategy equilibrium with similar properties as those in case of
listing fees, and agglomeration and segmentation occur with positive probability.
The mixed-strategy equilibrium is fully characterized in the proof of Proposition 7 in
the Appendix. As is evident from the proposition, the outcome with per-transaction fees
resembles the one with listing fees. First, if competition between sellers is weak (that is,
the ratio of duopoly to monopoly profit is relatively high), a pure-strategy agglomeration
equilibrium results with either type of fees, and platforms compete each other down to fees
equal to marginal cost. We note that the conditions for the agglomeration equilibrium to
occur coincide in Propositions 1 and 7: with listing fees, the condition is pid/pim ≥ 1/2,
which is the same as that with per-transaction fees, pid(0)/pim(0) ≥ 1/2.
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Second, if competition between sellers is fierce, a pure-strategy segmentation equi-
librium occurs. Here, platforms set the fee equal to φm to obtain the largest per-buyer
profit—similar to the case of listing fees. The conditions also have a similar interpretation.
With listing fees, the condition for the segmentation equilibrium to exist is pid/pim ≤ 1/4,
as a platform should have no incentive to attract both sellers and all buyers in each
category instead of only one seller and half of the buyers. With per-transaction fees,
the condition is [φ′Dd(φ′)]/[φmDm(φm)] ≤ 1/4, which rests on the same idea: given the
rival’s fee φm, in any category, a platform would attract both sellers and all buyers with
a fee of φ′. The condition precludes that such a deviation is profitable.
Finally, in the remaining region, a unique mixed-strategy equilibrium exists. As we
show in the proof of Proposition 7, this mixed-strategy equilibrium has properties similar
to those with listing fees, involving mixing either on a convex or on a non-convex set.
We illustrate the result obtained with Example 1. For t ≥ (v − c)/2, the condition
pid(0)/pim(0) ≥ 1/2 is fulfilled, and a pure-strategy agglomeration equilibrium occurs with
fees equal to 0. By contrast, for t < (v− c)/4, the above segmentation equilibrium is the
unique equilibrium. In the intermediate range, the mixed-strategy equilibrium occurs.
Therefore, mixing occurs for a larger range of parameters than with listing fees—in the
latter case, a mixed-strategy equilibrium emerges only for (v − c)/3 ≤ t < (v − c)/2.
5.1.2 Revenue Sharing
Another pricing instrument that platforms often use is a percentage fee on the revenue
made by sellers. For example, application platforms such as the Appstore or Google Play
usually charge a percentage fee of 30% on the seller’s revenue.
Such revenue sharing can also be incorporated into our model. Suppose, again, that
the game proceeds as laid out above but that each platform i = A,B extracts a revenue
share ri ∈ [0, 1] on each transaction it enables. The seller’s profit is then
pid(ri) =
[
(1− ri)pd(ri)− c
]
Dd(ri)
in duopoly, and
pim(ri) = [(1− ri)pm(ri)− c]Dm(pm(ri))
in monopoly, where Dm(ri) (respectively, D
d(ri)) is the demand in the seller’s monopoly
solution (respectively, the sellers’ duopoly solution) if platform i demands a revenue share
of ri. Applying the Implicit Function Theorem, it is easy to show that under standard
assumptions on demand, pd(ri) and p
m(ri) are increasing in ri, as long as costs are strictly
positive; if c = 0, prices are independent of ri. In addition, both profits and demands are
decreasing in ri.
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We again impose the reasonable assumption that
∂pim(ri)
∂ri
≤ ∂pi
d(ri)
∂ri
≤ 0 and ∂D
m(ri)
∂ri
≤ ∂D
d(ri)
∂ri
≤ 0,
which is fulfilled in the examples given in Section 2. The model with revenue sharing
can be analyzed in the same way as the one with per-transaction fees. Although the
exact conditions for the boundaries of the equilibrium regions are slightly different, we
can show that the results closely resemble those with per-transaction fees.31 Also, under
revenue sharing, platforms do not extract the entire profits of sellers in the segmentation
equilibrium: platforms set r = rm, with rm = arg maxri rip
m(ri)D
m(pm(ri))/2. Thus,
platforms obtain the highest profit that is compatible with segmentation in stage 2. Thus,
our main insight carries over to the setting with revenue sharing between platforms and
sellers.
5.1.3 Two-Part Tariffs
So far, we have considered listing fees and per-transaction fees separately. However,
platforms could also charge two-part tariffs that combine the two fees (or combine listing
fees and revenue shares). Although we do not present this analysis, the results obtained
in the separate study of the two cases suggest that they also hold with two-part tariffs. In
particular, if the ratio pid/pim is small, a segmentation equilibrium will also occur under
two-part tariffs, as sellers will avoid competition, and platforms can charge positive fees.
Similarly, if an agglomeration equilibrium emerges (i.e., if pid/pim is sufficiently large),
both fees within the two-part tariff are driven down to zero, implying that we obtain the
same result as in the analysis of the two separate cases.
In addition, the listing fee avoids distortions of the sellers’ product market prices and
is, therefore, the more efficient instrument in the two-part tariff. It follows, for example,
that in the pure-strategy segmentation equilibrium, both platforms will set a listing fee
of pim/2 and a per-transaction fee of zero, as this guarantees the highest profit. As a
consequence, even if we allowed for two-part tariffs, the results would be similar to those
obtained in the model with pure listing fees.
The superiority of the listing fee compared to the transaction fee (or revenue share)
follows from the homogeneity of categories and sellers. Suppose, instead, that categories
were heterogeneous. This implies that sellers in different categories are also heteroge-
neous. For example, each category has a different likelihood of being the product category
that buyers prefer. Thus, there are more-popular and less-popular categories. Sellers in
less-popular categories then obtain a lower expected revenue. As product market prices
31We omit the proof of this result as is it follows that of Proposition 7.
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do not react to listing fees but to transaction fees (and revenue shares), a platform can
optimally ensure sellers’ participation in less-popular categories with a mixture of both
fees. Thus, with heterogeneous product categories, in a segmentation equilibrium, a plat-
form does not necessarily charge only listing fees. In the extreme, as the likelihood that
some product categories will be the preferred ones becomes negligible, a platform may
not want to rely on listing fees, as this would imply the unavailability of some product
categories. Platforms will then exclusively use transaction fees or revenue shares.
5.2 General Number of Sellers and Platforms
In this subsection, we extend our model to a finite number of platforms and sellers
per category. Suppose that there are M sellers (per category) and N platforms, with
M,N > 1. We denote the per-buyer profit of a seller competing with m− 1 others sellers
by pi(m), with pi(m) ≥ pi(m+ 1) ≥ 0 ∀m = 1, ...,M − 1—in terms of the notation of the
baseline model, pi(1) = pim and pi(2) = pid. All other assumptions and the equilibrium
refinement in the second stage are the same as in main model.
In addition, we also impose an equilibrium selection criterion in the first stage. With a
general number of platforms and sellers, the equilibrium in the fee-setting game between
platforms may not be unique. Then, as a refinement, we assume that platforms choose
the profit-dominant equilibrium.
The main differences from our baseline model are twofold: First, with a general
number of sellers and platforms, the number of sellers is no longer necessarily a multiple
of the number of platforms. The question is, therefore, how sellers, in order to make
buyers indifferent, allocate if multiple platforms carry a positive volume of trade. Second,
it may be optimal for platforms in the first stage to exclude sellers via the choice of their
listing fees. As we will demonstrate below, this may occur in a segmentation equilibrium.
Following the same structure as with different pricing instruments, we characterize in
the next proposition the regions in which the different types of equilibria exist, thereby
pointing out the analogy to the simpler baseline model. To write the proposition in the
most concise form, we define k as the largest integer, such that M ≥ kN . For example,
if M = 11 and N = 4, then k = 2.
Proposition 8. Consider the case in which M ≥ N :
If
pi(k + 1)
pi(k)
≥ 1
N
, (1)
in equilibrium f ?i = 0, ∀i = 1, ..., N , platform profits are 0, and there is positive trade
only on a subset of platforms.
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If for some l ∈ {1, ..., k}
mˆpi(mˆ)
lpi(l)
≤ 1
N
, (2)
with mˆ ∈ arg maxl<m≤M mpi(m), in the unique profit-dominant equilibrium f ?i = pi(l?)/N ,
with l? ∈ arg maxl lpi(l) for all l ∈ {1, ..., k} that satisfy (2), platform profits are Π?i =
l?pi(l?)/N ∀i = 1, ..., N , and all platforms carry a positive volume of trade.
If neither (1) nor (2) is satisfied, there is a unique profit-dominant mixed-strategy
equilibrium, in which platforms make positive profits.
Consider the case in which M < N : In equilibrium, f ?i = 0 ∀i = 1, ..., N , and platform
profits are 0.
If there are at least as many sellers (in each category) as platforms, the proposition
demonstrates that the qualitative features of the equilibrium are similar to those in the
baseline model. If competition between sellers is relatively moderate, a seller’s profit when
one additional seller joins the platform falls only by a small amount (i.e., pi(k+1)/pi(k) is
relatively large), which implies that condition (1) is satisfied. Thus, equilibrium platform
fees are zero.
In analogy to the baseline model, this equilibrium prevails if sellers prefer to be active
only on a subset of platforms, given that all platforms charge zero fees. To relate this
to condition (1), note that k is the largest number of sellers, so that all platforms have
positive trade volume, and each one hosts k sellers (so that buyers are willing to split
between platforms). Condition (1) states that such a configuration will not emerge in
the second stage, as sellers have an incentive to deviate.32 With trade occurring only on
a subset of platforms, no platform can charge a strictly positive fee as it loses its buyers
and sellers to a competitor with zero fee.
In contrast to the baseline model, such an equilibrium does not necessarily lead to
full agglomeration, as it may be optimal for some sellers to locate on one platform and
other sellers on another. Nevertheless, only a subset of platforms carry a positive volume
of trade, which implies at least partial agglomeration, and equilibrium fees of zero. This
must also be the equilibrium outcome if the number of platforms exceeds the number
of sellers in a category, as it implies that at least one platform will not have a positive
volume of trade.
By contrast, in a pure-strategy segmentation equilibrium, all platforms carry a pos-
itive volume of trade. In analogy to the baseline model, this equilibrium occurs if com-
petition between sellers is intense. From condition (2), the equilibrium exists if, in each
category, every platform hosts l sellers, and no platform can obtain a higher profit by
attracting a larger number of sellers (where attracting a number mˆ is the most profitable
32In the baseline model, we have k = 1, and, thus, condition (1) is equivalent to pid/pim ≥ 1/2.
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one among these deviations). The condition for a segmentation equilibrium to exist in
the model with a general number of platforms and sellers resembles that of the baseline
model. In the baseline model, we have l = 1 and mˆ = 2, and, thus, condition (2) is
equivalent to pid/pim ≤ 1/4.
The key difference from the baseline model is that the segmentation equilibrium may
lead to the exclusion of some sellers—that is, the equilibrium number of sellers on a
platform, l?, may be less than k. If M > kN , this must be the case, as a segmentation
equilibrium involves at least M−kN inactive sellers. However, even if M = kN , it can be
optimal for platforms to charge such a high fee that some sellers prefer to stay inactive.
The reason is that becoming active increases competition and, therefore, would not allow
the seller to recover the fee. In addition, with a general number of sellers, a segmentation
equilibrium may involve more than one seller in each category on a platform if this allows
platforms to obtain a higher profit. As in the baseline model, platforms extract the entire
profit from all active sellers.
Finally, in the region in which neither condition (1) nor condition (2) holds, a mixed-
strategy equilibrium occurs. The intuition and the properties are the same as in the
baseline model.
In our analysis, we consider the situation with a given number of sellers M with
positive profit (gross of the listing fee). Instead, if sellers incurred a fixed entry cost F ,
pi(m) − F would become negative for m sufficiently large, as more intense competition
drives down margins. Then, even if platforms charge zero fees, no platform would be host
to an unlimited number of sellers. Yet, considering a game with free entry yields similar
results to those of Proposition 8. The conditions for the equilibrium regions differ, but
the qualitative results that buyers and sellers may segment and that platforms obtain
positive profits continue to hold. If there is a finite m′ as the solution to pi(m′)/N−F > 0
and pi(m′+1)/N−F < 0, the region in which the agglomeration equilibrium exists shrinks
and eventually vanishes as the number of available sellers M becomes sufficiently large.
The reason for this result is that with zero fees, each platform would host m′ sellers. A
seller’s profit is then strictly positive, which gives each platform an incentive to increase
its fee. To sum up, with entry, pure agglomeration cannot occur when the number of
sellers that may enter is large and, thus, segmentation becomes more likely.
5.3 Buyer-Preferred Equilibrium
In this subsection, we demonstrate how our equilibrium would change if we used the con-
cept of payoff-dominance of buyers (instead of sellers) in the second stage, in addition to
coalition-proofness. Because V d > V m, buyers prefer an agglomeration equilibrium over
a segmentation or stand-alone equilibrium. This implies that whenever the refinement
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of coalition-proofness alone does not suffice to select a unique equilibrium, it is payoff-
dominant for buyers to choose an agglomeration equilibrium whenever it exists—as above,
the two refinements are never in conflict with each other.
Figure 6 shows the different equilibrium regions with this selection rule. As long as
at least one platform sets a fee below pid, an agglomeration equilibrium exists and will be
selected. However, if both fees are larger than pid, an agglomeration equilibrium does not
exist, as sellers would obtain negative profits. The selected equilibrium is then the same
as in Section 3 because buyers are indifferent between the segmentation and a stand-alone
equilibrium: if both exist, only the segmentation equilibrium is coalition-proof.
-
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Figure 6: Selected equilibrium configurations with payoff-dominance
of buyers
Turning to the first stage, there is now always an equilibrium in which platform fees
are equal to 0. Given that platform i sets fi = 0, an agglomeration equilibrium exists
and will be selected. Hence, platform −i cannot do better than to also set f−i = 0.
However, this equilibrium is not the only one if pid/pim ≤ 1/4. By the same logic as in
Section 3, if each platform charges a fee of pim/2, no platform has a profitable deviation.
Therefore, a segmentation equilibrium in which platforms extract the entire profits from
sellers also exists and is profit-dominant for platforms. Invoking profit-dominance, the
same segmentation equilibrium as in Section 3 emerges. Therefore, our result does not
hinge on the selection criterion in stage 2.
If a buyer-preferred equilibrium is selected, no mixed-strategy equilibrium exists. The
reason is as follows: If pid/pim > 1/4, a platform has an incentive to deviate from the
equilibrium candidate fA = fB = pi
m/2 and to set a fee below pid to induce agglomeration.
The best response of the rival platform is then to undercut this fee slightly, as it cannot
induce segmentation with a higher fee (in contrast to the case with a seller-preferred
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equilibrium in stage 2). Then, the standard Bertrand argument applies, leading to zero
fees in equilibrium. Therefore, if the buyer-preferred equilibrium is chosen, we obtain
f ?A = f
?
B = 0 if pi
d/pim > /4 and f ?A = f
?
B = pi
m/2 if pid/pim ≤ 1/4.
5.4 Two-Sided Pricing
In the baseline model, we considered the situation in which platforms can set fees only to
sellers. This is a common practice among most trading platforms. A main reason is that
buyers are often uncertain about whether or not they want to buy a product, and they
first inform themselves on the platform about available offers and product characteristics.
Thus, charging a subscription fee will deter many buyers. In addition, some buyers often
obtain only a small surplus, and so platforms can charge only a very small fee to keep
these buyers on board. With small transaction costs from each payment (e.g., due to
fraud), it is more effective to charge sellers who are usually fewer in numbers.
Apart from these justifications for not charging buyers, which are outside the model,
we can demonstrate that the segmentation equilibrium derived in the baseline model is
robust to two-sided pricing (that is, platforms set a subscription fee to buyers, fb, on top
of the listing fee to sellers, fs), provided that negative fees are not possible.
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We focus on the situation pid/pim ≤ 1/4, in which the pure-strategy segmentation equi-
librium exists with one-sided pricing. Platforms then set a seller fee fs = pi
m/2 and ex-
tract the full seller surplus. With two-sided pricing, a fee combination of {fs = pim/2, fb = 0}
for both platforms is no longer an equilibrium under the refinement of coalition-proofness
and seller-dominant equilibrium. To see this, suppose that platform −i sets {fs =
pim/2, fb = 0}. Platform i can then set fees equal to
{
fs = pi
d − , fb = V d − V m
}
and
attract all sellers and buyers because sellers obtain a profit of  > 0 on platform i instead
of 0 on platform −i. Therefore, the coalition of all sellers and buyers on platform −i is
better off by moving to platform i, as buyers are indifferent and obtain a payoff of V m on
both platforms (it can be shown that setting fees equal to
{
fS = pi
d − , fB = V d − V m
}
is, indeed, the most profitable coalition-proof deviation). The profit of platform i is then
(almost) equal to 2pid + V d − V m. Although we are in the region with pid/pim ≤ 1/4, the
profit from deviating is larger than pim/2, as 4pid + 2(V d − V m) > pim due to the fact
V d + pid > V m + pim.
33With negative fees, a divide-and-conquer strategy can destabilize the segmentation equilibrium.
Under divide-and-conquer, a deviating platform sets a sufficiently low fee on one side to ensure that
this side participates for sure. It can then use the fee on the other side to extract surplus on that side.
In particular, a platform deviating from the segmentation equilibrium can attract sellers with negative
fees and extract the full surplus generated on the buyer side. However, such negative fees are usually
not feasible, as they generate losses for platforms from otherwise uninterested participants who inflate
participation levels without generating any transaction opportunities.
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Determining the equilibrium for the range pid/pim ≤ 1/4, we obtain (following ar-
guments similar to those in the baseline model) that the unique equilibrium under our
refinement is {f ?s = 0, f ?b = V m} and segmentation occurs. With these fees, no platform
can attract more sellers since this would lead to competition between them and, therefore,
to a reduction in sellers’ profits. Instead of extracting the sellers’ profits, platforms do not
leave surplus to buyers. Importantly, though, despite this difference in fees between one-
sided and two-sided pricing, the main intuition for the segmentation equilibrium to occur
is the same: sellers avoid competition by being active on both platforms, and platforms
exploit this role of segmenting the market by charging strictly positive fees.
If in stage 2 buyers and sellers play the equilibrium that buyers prefer (in addition to
coalition-proofness), the equilibrium fees would be the same as in the case of one-sided
pricing—that is, {f ?s = pim/2, f ?b = 0}. Setting a strictly positive fee to buyers can never
be profitable for a platform, as then all buyers prefer the rival platform. Given this, the
same arguments as in Section 5.3 apply. Although buyers prefer agglomeration, platforms
avoid this in equilibrium by setting listing fees to sellers above pid.
5.5 Further extensions
In our preceding analysis, we have shown the robustness of the tradeoffs involved between
segmentation and agglomeration in a number of settings. However, we maintained the
independence between categories and the homogeneity of buyer behavior. In this section,
we discuss what happens in richer settings that allow for these features.
5.5.1 Interdependence between Categories
Competition across categories
In our analysis, we assumed that each buyer is interested in exactly one product
category. Suppose, instead, that a buyer receives a positive gross utility from buying a
product in a category other that her preferred one (which, by construction, is less than
from products in her preferred category). Then, products in different categories are sub-
stitutes. As a consequence, the demand for a product in the preferred category may be
lower if prices in different categories are lower. Sellers will take this into account in their
pricing decisions, implying that products from different categories may impose competi-
tive constraints. As a consequence, prices will be weakly lower than in our model. This
leads to lower values of pim and, possibly, of pid. Hence, in the segmentation equilibrium,
platforms’ fees will be weakly lower, and, depending on the profit ratio pid/pim, the re-
gions for the segmentation and agglomeration equilibrium will be affected by competition
across platforms. However, the main effects driving the results are still present, and our
main insights are robust.
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We can restate our main conclusions in a different setting, in which there is only one
product (and, thus, one seller) per product category. With this simplification, since sellers
do not compete, the market necessarily features agglomeration. Introducing competition
between categories, the equilibrium switches to segmentation if segmentation sufficiently
reduces seller competition. In such a segmentation equilibrium, half of the categories are
listed on platform A and the other half on platform B. This result is in the same spirit
as our findings in the baseline model.
Platforms with diseconomies
Another source of interdependence between categories could be platform diseconomies
in the number of categories. Platforms experience such diseconomies if the number of
product categories on a platform has a direct and negative effect on buyer utility. Such
congestion externalities can be present because, for instance, it becomes more costly for
a buyer to find the preferred product category as the number of categories increases.
This implies that a buyer experiences a utility loss if the number of listed categories
is large. If platforms can endogenously choose this number, then, to avoid repelling
buyers, they may not list some categories in equilibrium. This implies that even in an
agglomeration equilibrium, listing fees may be positive, as lowering the fee to zero induces
the participation of sellers in all categories, which is not attractive to buyers.34
Alternatively, the number of product categories may affect buyer utility indirectly.
This happens if the optimal presentation of products on a platform depends on the prod-
uct category. Suppose that a platform has to commit to a unique format for presenting
products (e.g., to avoid confusing buyers). Then, if very different product categories are
listed, the presentation format is not optimal for some products, and, thus, the utility
of buyers who prefer these products is reduced. As above, a consequence is that some
products will be delisted.35
5.5.2 Heterogeneous Buyer Behavior
In our model, buyers are ex ante identical. In particular, they do not prefer one platform
over the other. Although this assumption ensures that platforms are fully homogeneous
ex ante and, therefore, strengthens our theoretical contribution, it may not be in line with
the consumer behavior observed in some markets. For example, a fraction of buyers may
be loyal to a platform. Similarly, some buyers may decide very quickly on which platform
34One could also imagine that product categories differ by the probability of being the preferred
category. Then, popular categories will be listed, but less popular categories will be delisted.
35An example in which a platform did not cater well to buyer tastes with its presentation of particular
product categories is the market for handmade and vintage items on Ebay. Newer platforms, such as Etsy
and Dawanda, offered sellers the opportunity to offer more information, and this led to a quick migration
of buyers and sellers to these new platforms. This suggests that Ebay was subject to diseconomies in
the number of listed product categories and lost out to newcomers.
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to be active and, therefore, assign themselves randomly to a platform. Suppose that each
platform has a fraction β/2 of loyal buyers and that all other buyers are shoppers—i.e.,
they join the platform that offers the highest expected utility as in our baseline model.
To reach loyal buyers, sellers have to list on both platforms (as, for example, in hotel
booking or food delivery services). Thus, if sellers can multi-home, in an equilibrium
that corresponds to an agglomeration equilibrium, both platforms set a positive listing
fee equal to the duopoly profit that a seller earns from loyal buyers so as to induce
seller multi-homing. By contrast, in an equilibrium that corresponds to a segmentation
equilibrium—i.e., each platform attracts half of the shoppers—sellers single-home along
the equilibrium path because the insights from Section 4.2 still hold.
6 Policy Implications and Predictions
6.1 Policy Implications
Our paper has several normative implications that can guide policy makers in regulating
platform markets. These implications rest on the insight that market segmentation has
undesirable welfare properties: segmentation leads lower total welfare and consumer wel-
fare than agglomeration due to less choice for buyers and higher product prices. However,
platforms benefit from segmenting the market, as this allows them to extract rents from
sellers. This conflict between what is in the interest of platforms and what is in the
interest of society may justify policy intervention.
It is important for policy makers to distinguish between segmentation due to multiple
active platforms enabling sellers to reduce competition, and segmentation resulting from
inherent differentiation between platforms. In the former case, as just pointed out, seg-
mentation is welfare-decreasing, whereas in the latter case, platforms cater to different
buyer (and perhaps seller) tastes, which, all else equal, is welfare-increasing. It seems
possible to find out the cause of segmentation, as the degree of product differentiation
can be measured by appropriate tests (e.g., SNIPP test).36
Beyond this general observation, our framework generates a number of specific impli-
cations for antitrust, regulation, and merger control.
Exclusive contracts. A widely-discussed issue in platform markets is the use of ex-
clusive contracts.37 Such contracts restrict sellers to offering their products exclusively
on one platform (in exchange for a favorable deal on the fee charged by the platform).
36See Affeldt, Filistrucchi and Klein (2013) for an application of the SNIPP test to platform markets.
37For example, in the video game industry, console platforms often impose console exclusivity, which
prevents game developers from selling a similar game on rival consoles (see Lee, 2013, for an in-depth
analysis). As another example, trading platforms sometimes require ‘special’ offers by sellers to be
exclusive on them.
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Therefore, these exclusive contracts rule out seller multi-homing. As we showed in Sec-
tion 4.2, if sellers can multi-home, an agglomeration equilibrium is more likely to arise,
implying that a restriction to single-homing is anti-competitive. In this respect, our pa-
per provides a new rationale for why exclusive contracts are welfare-decreasing: they help
sellers to commit to a single platform, thereby sustaining market segmentation.
Price caps on listing fees. A policy instrument to curb firms’ market power in general
is to set price caps. At first glance, this might also look attractive in our framework as a
way to tame the market power of platforms vis-a-vis sellers (i.e., platforms charge strictly
positive listing fees only in a segmentation equilibrium). Therefore, one may think that
regulating fees via caps can lead to agglomeration. However, the fundamental problem is
that even with low fees, sellers choose segmentation by themselves if they obtain higher
profits with this configuration. Therefore, caps on listing fees are not helpful to achieve
agglomeration and are merely a rent-shifting device.
Merger control. Suppose that sellers in some product categories consider merging.38
Such mergers generally reduce competition in the particular product category and, as
a consequence, favor agglomeration. Thus, our theory predicts that market tipping is
more likely in industries following mergers between sellers. If there is segmentation
prior to the merger, but agglomeration afterwards, a merger may increase total welfare,
and even consumer welfare, as buyers find, in expectation, a better match. On the
downside, they pay the prices set by a two-product instead of a single-product monopolist,
which are higher if products are substitutes. Overall, we have identified an efficiency
defense for mergers among sellers in a platform market: if the merging sellers operate on
different platforms prior to the merger, the merger may make the market tip, which can
be beneficial to buyers, as it improves the match quality.39
6.2 Predictions
Our theory leads to novel predictions that are empirically testable.
Correlation between market concentration and fee levels in the platform market. Our
theory predicts a negative correlation between market concentration and the level of the
listing fee in platform markets. More precisely, for a given number of available platforms,
our theory predicts that the relation between market concentration, in terms of market
share, and the level of the (average) listing fee is negative. In markets that feature
agglomeration, platform fees are lower than in markets in which platforms have a more
38Such mergers occurred in several intermediated industries in recent years. For example, in the
housing market, big real estate agencies acquired many smaller companies. Similarly, in the video game
industry, several software-developing companies have recently merged.
39If, prior to the merger, the market is characterized by agglomeration, the merger leads to multi-
product monopoly instead of duopoly prices. Thus, it necessarily decreases consumer welfare.
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equal market share. This reverses the prediction of standard theory. Our prediction
is testable, for example, by analyzing cross-industry or cross-country variation in the
data. To make a meaningful comparison, one would need to condition on the market
characteristics and then consider the correlation between the Hirshman-Herfindahl Index
(HHI) of active firms and the level of the listing fee. There would be support for our
theory if platform fees were larger in markets with a smaller HHI.
Correlation between market characteristics in the product market and concentration
in the platform market. Our theory provides a prediction concerning the relation between
the prevailing conditions in the intermediated product market and the market outcome
in the platform market. Specifically, if competition in the intermediated product market
is weak, the platform market will be more concentrated (measured by the HHI). Possi-
ble sources for different degrees of competitiveness in the product market are manifold.
They could be due to differences in the degree of product differentiation or differences of
the ratio between sellers and buyers in thin markets. The prediction can be tested, for
example, by looking at different regional markets within the same industry and country
or by considering different broadly defined product categories. As platforms usually op-
erate country-wide and across broad product categories, the same number of platforms
may well be present, but concentration may vary between different regions or product
categories. If a product market has characteristics that are unfavorable to strong compe-
tition between sellers—i.e., profits are relatively high even if sellers compete—our theory
predicts agglomeration. Thus, reduced competition among sellers tends to lead to market
tipping.
As an example, consider price comparison websites. Suppose that buyers consider a
purchase within a broad product category and do not yet know which specific product
they like. In broad product categories in which there is little room for differentiation
between sellers’ offers, competition between sellers is intense, and, thus, it is likely that
sellers segment. The opposite holds in the broad product categories in which product
differentiation between sellers is pronounced.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a theory of competing platforms that enable trade
between buyers and sellers. Platforms are homogeneous and charge fees to sellers, and
sellers compete in the product market. We have analyzed how the competitive conditions
in the seller market affect platform market structure.
Can multiple platforms exist and earn positive profits even if there is no differentia-
tion between them? We show that the function of multiple platforms as an endogenous
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segmentation device for competing sellers can explain such an outcome. Sellers choose
to be active on different platforms to avoid fierce competition. Platforms exploit this by
setting positive fees, and obtain strictly positive profits. Thus, multiple homogeneous
platforms have a positive market share. Such a segmentation equilibrium exists if com-
petition between sellers is sufficiently strong. If, by contrast, there is little competition
between sellers, the standard intuition is confirmed: the equilibrium features agglomera-
tion, and platform fees are low. As a consequence of these results, the relation between
market concentration and fees is negative. Platform fees are low in concentrated markets
but high if market shares are similar.
Our main insights are robust to several different model formulations—i.e., they do
not depend on the platform pricing instrument, the possibility of buyer and seller multi-
homing, and the number of platforms and sellers. In addition, the framework generates
several policy implications and predictions that are empirically testable.
In our model, we did not consider endogenous entry of platforms. Although a domi-
nant platform emerges in our agglomeration equilibrium, fees are driven down to marginal
costs, and the market is contestable with the presence of competitors. By contrast, if
platforms incurred fixed costs from entry, only one platform would enter whenever the
equilibrium is characterized by agglomeration. This single platform would then act as a
monopolist and charge a high fee. While such monopoly positions may occur, in reality,
we observe that in several platform markets, there is a dominant platform together with
some competitors who only have negligible market shares. These competing platforms
may, however, have larger market shares in related markets and incur little cost to serve
buyers and sellers also in markets in which they are currently negligible. For example, in
the second-hand good market, Ebay can be considered as a dominant platform for many
broadly defined product segments. However, Ebay’s market power is restrained by other
platforms, small (e.g., Ebid and Bonanza) or large (Amazon), elsewhere.40
We placed our analysis in a static context and focused on platform pricing and subse-
quent subscription decisions of buyers and sellers. We leave extensions such as dynamic
competition between platforms and the platforms’ innovation incentives for future re-
search.
40In some product segments, the dominant platform may alternatively be a specialized one with a
smaller selection of products. A case in point is Etsy, which tends to specialize in handcrafted products
and may be considered dominant in the United States. While Ebay essentially lost this market segment
to Etsy, it remains a potential competitor.
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Appendix A: Equilibrium Selection in Stage 2
In the first step, we determine all Nash equilibria in stage 2, given fees (fi, f−i). In a
second step, we show how the refinement of coalition-proofness plus profit dominance of
sellers singles out an essentially unique equilibrium. The qualification to the uniqueness
is that if fi = f−i, under some conditions two payoff-equivalent equilibria exist. As will
become evident below, these equilibria are agglomeration either on platform A or B, or
stand-alone either on platform A or B, dependent on the level of fi. However, as the
equilibria are payoff-equivalent, selecting among them is not necessary.
Suppose that the mass of sellers is unequal on both platforms, i.e., αi sellers are on
platform i and α−i < αi sellers are on platform −i. Then all buyers will join platform
i. This implies that sellers on platform −i have a profitable deviation to either go the
platform i or be inactive for any f−i > 0. It follows that in equilibrium either one platform
has no sellers and no buyers, or αi = α−i, which makes buyers indifferent and induces
them to split equally between the two platforms under our tie-breaking rule.
We start with the situation, in which there is trade on only one platform. As sellers
are homogeneous across categories, there cannot be an equilibrium in which sellers in
different categories follow different strategies. The reason is that if it is profitable for
one or both sellers in some categories to list on the platform with a positive volume of
trade, this must also be true for sellers in the remaining categories. There can be two
equilibrium configurations in which only one platform carries a positive volume of trade.
The first configuration is an agglomeration equilibrium, in which all sellers and all
buyers agglomerate on one platform. A seller’s profit is then pid. Hence, an equilibrium
with agglomeration on platform i exists if fi ≤ pid, independent of f−i. The second
equilibrium configuration is a stand-alone equilibrium, in which in each category only
one seller is active on platform i and all buyers go to platform i. This configuration
occurs if pim ≥ fi > pid, independent of f−i. This equilibrium cannot occur with fi < pid,
as in this case both sellers in each category prefer to be active on platform i.
We now turn to the equilibrium configuration, in which αi = α−i. The following three
types of seller compositions give rise to αi = α−i.
(i) In each category, one seller lists on platform i and one seller lists on platform −i.
(ii) In 1/2 of the categories, both sellers list on platform i and in the other half both
sellers list on platform −i.
(iii) In 1/2 of the categories, one seller lists on platform i and in the other half one seller
lists on platform −i.
In addition, any convex combination of these three seller compositions (i.e., mixing be-
tween the three types) leads to αi = α−i. Note that it can never be an equilibrium that
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in fewer than 1/2 of the categories both or one seller list on platform i and platform −i.
The reason is that non-active sellers have a profitable deviation to become active. This is
because platform fees must be such that the resulting profits are higher than the listing
fees as otherwise there can be no categories in which sellers are willing to list.
We now show that types (ii) and (iii) can never occur in equilibrium. Consider case
(ii). Since in 1/2 of the categories, both sellers are active on platform i, we must have
fi ≤ pid/2. If a seller active on platform −i then deviates to platform i, its profit changes
from pid/2− f−i to pim/2− fi. By a similar argument, if a seller deviates from platform i
to platform −i, its profit changes from pid/2−fi to pim/2−f−i. This implies that case (ii)
can only be an equilibrium if pid/2− f−i ≥ pim/2− fi and pid/2− fi ≥ pim/2− f−i. Since
pid/pim < 1, both conditions cannot jointly hold, implying that there must be a profitable
deviation. Similarly, in case (iii) platform fees must be smaller than pim/2, which implies
that non-active sellers have a profitable deviation to list on the platform in which the
competitor is not active. Since those two types cannot be an equilibrium configuration,
mixing among the three types can also be excluded by the same arguments.
As a consequence, the configuration in which both platforms are active can only be
such that each platform is host to one seller in each category. This equilibrium can only
occur if platform fees are below pim/2, and no seller has an incentive to deviate and
become active on the other platform. The latter condition implies
pim
2
− fi ≥ pi
d
2
− f−i
Rewriting this condition, we obtain that a segmentation equilibrium exists if and only if
fi ≤ min
{
pim − pid
2
+ f−i,
pim
2
}
. (3)
As illustrated in Figure 1, for any combination of listing fees (fi, f−i) with fi ≤ pim and
f−i ≤ pim, multiple equilibria exist in stage 2.
Finally, we note that for all (fi, f−i) a no-trade Nash equilibrium exists in which nei-
ther buyers nor sellers participate on either platform. However, this no-trade equilibrium
is not coalition-proof whenever some other equilibrium exists. We therefore disregard it
in the following discussion.
In the second step, we demonstrate how our selection rule singles out a unique equi-
librium (unique subject to the qualification above). We start with the cases in which only
a single equilibrium configuration exists (i.e., agglomeration or stand-alone) but multiple
equilibria occur because agents can coordinate on either platform. First, consider the
case in which there are the two equilibria, where all sellers (and buyers) agglomerate on
platform A or platform B. If both platforms charge a fee below pid and fi 6= f−i, coalition-
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proofness implies that all sellers and buyers coordinate on the platform with the lower
fee, that is, they agglomerate on platform i if fi ≤ f−i.41 Within this coalition, there is
also no subcoalition that can improve by being active on platform −i. Similarly, if both
platforms charge a fee larger than pid and the two equilibria in which only half of the
sellers are active on platform A or on platform B exist (i.e., the stand-alone equilibria),
then sellers choose platform i if and only if fi < f−i.
Now we turn to cases, in which multiple equilibrium configurations exist. First,
consider the case in which agglomeration and stand-alone equilibria exist. From the
arguments above, this occurs if one platform, say platform −i, charges a fee below pid
whereas the other one charges a fee above pid. However, the stand-alone equilibrium is
then not coalition-proof because a coalition consisting of all buyers and all inactive sellers
has a profitable deviation. If all these agents choose to be active on platform −i, then
buyers are indifferent (as the same number of sellers is then active on each platform) but
the profits of the formerly inactive sellers strictly increase from 0 to pim − fi > 0. In
addition, no subcoalition can deviate and be strictly better off. By the same argument, if
stand-alone and segmentation equilibria exist, a stand-alone equilibrium is not coalition-
proof, whereas a segmentation equilibrium is. To see this, note that for these equilibrium
configurations to co-exist, we must have that pid/pim < 1/2 and that both fees are between
pid and pim/2. Thus, no coalition of sellers has the incentive to deviate from a segmentation
equilibrium.42
Finally, we turn to the region, in which segmentation and agglomeration equilibria
exist. The profit of each seller in an agglomeration equilibrium on platform i is pid − fi.
By contrast, in a segmentation equilibrium, the profit of a sellers is either pim/2 − fi or
pim/2− f−i dependent on which platform the seller is active. Let us first look at the case
pid/pim ≥ 1/2. It is evident that a coalition of all sellers active on the platform with the
higher fee, say platform i (i.e., fi ≥ f−i), and all buyers on this platform have a profitable
deviation to switch to platform −i. After such a deviation, the sellers are (weakly) better
off because pid − f−i ≥ pim/2 − fi due to the fact that pid/pim ≥ 1/2 and f−i ≤ fi, and
buyers are better off because they observe the offers of both sellers and not only one. It
follows that for pid/pim ≥ 1/2, the segmentation equilibrium is eliminated.43
We now turn to the case pid/pim < 1/2. We first show that a similar mechanism as
the one in the previous paragraph does only partly work then. In particular, sellers on
platform i (i.e., the platform with the higher fee) prefer agglomeration on platform −i
41This is also the profit-dominant equilibrium for sellers.
42In these regions, profit-dominance of sellers either selects the same equilibrium as coalition-proofness,
or profit-dominance has no bite as some sellers prefer stand-alone over agglomeration (or segmentation)
whereas others have the opposite preference. Hence, coalition-proofness and profit-dominance are not in
conflict with each other.
43Again, profit-dominance of sellers also eliminates the segmentation equilibrium.
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over segmentation if and only if pid − f−i ≥ pim/2− fi or
fi ≥ pi
m
2
− pid + f−i.
If this inequality holds, the segmentation equilibrium is not coalition-proof because sellers
and buyers on platform i can profitably deviate and agglomerate on platform −i. This
shrinks the range for the segmentation equilibrium. In particular, for fees below pid, the
equilibrium exists for fi ≤ (pim − pid)/2 + f−i, whereas it survives the refinement only if
fi < pi
m/2 − pid + f−i.44 If fi < pim/2 − pid + f−i, the refinement of coalition-proofness
has no bite. However, the refinement of profit-dominance for sellers then selects the
segmentation equilibrium as the unique equilibrium. In particular, the inequality ensures
that sellers on platform i are better off in the segmentation equilibrium than in the
agglomeration equilibrium, and the condition pid/pim < 1/2 guarantees that also sellers
on platform −i prefer segmentation over agglomeration because pim/2− f−i > pid − f−i.
Therefore, our equilibrium refinement selects the following equilibrium, given any
(fi, f−i) with fi ≤ pim and f−i ≤ pim:
(i) If pid/pim ≥ 1/2, then
– for fi, f−i ≥ pid, the equilibrium is STAi if fi ≤ f−i;
– for all other values, the equilibrium is AGGi if fi ≤ f−i.
(ii) If pid/pim < 1/2, then
– for fi, f−i ≤ pid, the equilibrium is SEG if f−i < pim/2− pid + fi, and AGGi if
f−i ≥ pim/2− pid + fi.
– for fi ≤ pid and f−i > pid, the equilibrium is AGGi.
– for fi, f−i ∈ (pid, pim/2], the equilibrium is SEG if f−i ≤ (pim − pid)/2− fi and
STAi if f−i > (pim − pid)/2− fi.
– for fi > pi
d and f−i > pim/2, the equilibrium is STAi if fi ≤ f−i.
Appendix B: Proof of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1. We first consider the case pid/pim ≥ 1/2. From Appendix A, we
know that an agglomeration equilibrium on platform i exits only if fi ≤ pid and fi ≤ f−i.
The latter condition occurs because, in the second stage, sellers and buyers will coordinate
on the equilibrium in which they all join the platform with the lower fee. This implies
44If both fees are above pid there is no restriction because the agglomeration equilibrium does not exist
then.
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that, in the first stage, for all f−i ≤ pid, platform i gains from undercutting the competing
platform. This induces agglomeration on platform i. The standard Bertrand logic then
applies and platforms set f ?A = f
?
B = 0 in equilibrium.
Now we turn to the case pid/pim < 1/2. It is evident from Appendix A that a seg-
mentation equilibrium is played if fees are symmetric. As a consequence, in a candidate
agglomeration equilibrium, the inactive platform must set a strictly positive fee. But
this platform then has the incentive to lower its fee (but still keep it strictly positive)
and induce segmentation. By doing so, it obtains a strictly positive profit, as half of the
sellers join the platform. This argument holds for any fA-fB-combination, which induces
agglomeration in the second stage. It follows that no agglomeration equilibrium exists
for pid/pim < 1/2.
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider the region of pid/pim < 1/2. In a segmentation equilib-
rium, a seller active on platform i obtains a profit of pim/2 − fi. Therefore, the highest
possible fee that a platform can charge equals pim/2, leaving sellers with zero profits. We
first determine the conditions under which an equilibrium with listing fees pim/2 exists.
If both platforms charge fi = pi
m/2, the only possible configuration in the second stage is
the segmentation equilibrium. This follows because the profit that a seller obtains with
agglomeration equals pid, which is below the listing fee.
Suppose that platform i deviates to induce an agglomeration equilibrium in the second
stage. To do so, it has to charge fdevi = pi
d−, where  > 0 can be arbitrarily small. Since
all buyers will agglomerate on platform i if all sellers do, sellers earn then a small positive
profit when agglomerating on platform i but zero in the segmentation equilibrium. The
deviation profit of platform i is then (letting → 0) Πdevi = 2pid since it obtains pid from
each seller. Therefore, a deviation is not profitable if pim/2 ≥ 2pid or pid/pim ≤ 1/4.
It follows that in this region, a segmentation equilibrium with listing fees (f ?A, f
?
B) =
(pim/2, pim/2) is the unique equilibrium. Platforms’ equilibrium profits are pim/2.
There cannot exist a segmentation equilibrium in which platforms charge fees less
than pim/2. The reason is that, given the equilibrium played in stage 2, a platform could
then increase its fee slightly, still induce segmentation at stage 2, and obtain a higher
profit.
Proof of Proposition 3. We first show the non-existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium.
Consider the region of 1/4 < pid/pim < 1/2. From Appendix A, we know that in this
region a segmentation equilibrium will be played in the second stage if both platforms
charge the same listing fees (conditional on these fees being lower than pim/2, which will
always be fulfilled in equilibrium). From Proposition 2 it follows that platforms cannot
extract the full profits from sellers because this would give each platform an incentive to
deviate to a lower fee and induce agglomeration. We proceed by first determining the
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highest fee that platforms could charge to make such a downward deviation unprofitable.
Suppose that both platforms charge a fee of pim/2 − x. Each platform’s profit is then
pim/2−x, and a seller’s profit is x. If platform i deviates in order to attract all sellers and
buyers in the second stage, it must set a fee such that pid−fdevi > x. The highest possible
deviation fee is therefore fdevi = pi
d−x− , leading to a deviation profit of (letting → 0)
2pid − 2x. Such a deviation is unprofitable if pim/2 − x ≥ 2pid − 2x or x ≥ 2pid − pim/2.
Hence, with an x equal to 2pid − pim/2, platforms prevent such a downward deviation.
The resulting listing fee is then fi = pi
m/2 − x = pim − 2pid, and the platform’s profit is
also pim − 2pid.
To determine if listing fees fi = fj = pi
m−2pid can constitute an equilibrium, we need
to check if a platform has an incentive to deviate by charging a higher listing fee (upward
deviation). Suppose that platform i charges fi = pi
m − 2pid and platform j charges a
deviation fee fdevj > fi such that segmentation is still the continuation equilibrium. To
induce a segmentation equilibrium, we must have pim/2− fdevj > pid− fi = 3pid−pim (i.e.,
a seller’s profit with segmentation must be higher than with agglomeration). Thus, the
highest possible listing fee is fdevj = 3pi
m/2 − 3pid −  = 3(pim/2 − pid) − , which yields
a larger platform profit than fi = 2(pi
m/2− pid). As a consequence, a profitable upward
deviation exists.
It follows that there is no equilibrium in pure strategies in the range of 1/4 < pid/pim <
1/2. The candidate equilibrium, which prevents downward deviations was fi = fj =
pim − 2pid; but then an upward deviation is profitable. In turn, for all listing fees above
pim − 2pid, a downward deviation is profitable.
Randomization domain. From the analysis above, we know that in the range 1/4 <
pid/pim < 1/2 for each fj, platform i has two best-response candidates: an upper best-
response candidate, denoted by f br
+
i , which is higher than fj by a discrete amount and
induces segmentation, and a lower best-response candidate, denoted by f br
−
i , which is
lower than fj by a discrete amount and induces agglomeration. We will now show that
there is a unique fj so that platform i obtains the same profit with either best-response
candidate. In addition, both candidates are increasing in fj. Due to platform symmetry,
this allows us to derive the randomization domain.
Suppose that platform j sets a fee fj. We now derive the best response of platform
i 6= j. The upper best response f br+i induces segmentation with the highest possible
fee. At this fee, sellers weakly prefer segmentation to agglomeration on j, which implies
that the inequality pim/2 − f br+i ≥ pid − fj is binding.45 This leads to a profit of f br+i =
pim/2 − pid + fj. Instead, the optimal lower best response f br−i is the largest fee which
induces agglomeration on platform i. Thus, we must have pid − f br−i > pim/2 − fj. The
45We assume that if sellers are indifferent between segmentation and agglomeration, they choose
segmentation. As we will show below, this is consistent with equilibrium behavior.
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lowest upper bound of platform i’s profit is then 2f br
−
i = 2(pi
d − pim/2 + fj).
The two profits reported above are equal at fj = 3/2pi
m−3pid. Thus, there is a unique
fj such that platform i just prefers the upper to the lower best-response candidate.
Platform i’s best response to fj ≤ 3/2pim − 3pid is to induce segmentation at f br+i =
pim/2− pid + fj = 2pim− 4pid, which is increasing in fj. Vice versa, for fj > 3/2pim− 3pid,
platform i’s profit from the lower best-response candidate is larger than that from the
upper best-response candidate because 2(pid−pim/2+fj) > pim/2−pid+fj for pid < pim/2.
This implies that its best response to fj > 3/2pi
m−3pid is f br−i = pid−pim/2+fj, which is
increasing in fj. Hence, along platform i’s best response, its maximal profit is reached at
fj = 3/2pi
m−3pid and is given by f br+i = 2pim−4pid. By symmetry, this leads to an upper
interval of the randomization domain equal to fj ∈ [3/2pim−3pid, 2pim−4pid]. Analogously,
the minimum of platform i’s best response to fj is reached at fj = 3/2pi
m − 3pid and is
given by f br
−
i = pi
m − 2pid. This leads to a lower interval of the randomization domain
equal to fj ∈ [pim − 2pid, 3/2pim − 3pid).
As a consequence, there is mixed-strategy equilibrium in which fi, fj ∈ [pim−2pid, 2pim−
4pid]. The expected profit in this equilibrium is 3pim/2−3pid. This is because when charg-
ing this fee, a platform induces segmentation with a probability of (almost) 1.
In this mixed-strategy equilibrium, the highest listing fee is 2pim−4pid. To ensure par-
ticipation of sellers, the highest fee a platform can charge (in a segmentation equilibrium)
is pim/2. Therefore, the equilibrium determined above is only valid if 2pim − 4pid ≤ pim/2
or pid/pim ≥ 3/8.
Mixing probabilities. In the range 3/8 ≤ pid/pim < 1/2, platforms set fees fi, fj ∈
[pim − 2pid, 2pim − 4pid], and the expected profit is Π?A = Π?B = 3pim/2− 3pid.
Let δ ≡ pim/2 − pid and  > 0 but infinitesimally small. Denote f ≡ 2δ, f˜ ≡ 3δ, and
f ≡ 4δ. Thus, the domain over which platforms mix is [f, f ] = [2δ, 4δ]. For i, j ∈ {A,B}
and i 6= j, the platforms’ best response functions are given by46
fˆi(fj) =
{
fj + δ, if fj ∈ [f, f˜ ];
fj − δ − , if fj ∈ (f˜ , f ].
We know that all fees in the mixing domain must give an expected profit of 3δ, as
otherwise platforms would not be indifferent between these fees. We need to distinguish
between two intervals, a lower and an upper one. The lower interval consists of fees
fi ∈ [2δ, 3δ) and the upper interval consist of fee fi ∈ [3δ, 4δ]. The reason for this
46As sellers choose segmentation in the second stage when being indifferent between segmentation and
agglomeration, the best response to fj marginally above f˜ is f , and the best response to fj = f˜ is f .
Therefore, all boundaries of the mixing region are well defined. By contrast, if sellers chose agglomeration
when indifferent, the upper bound would not be well defined, as f is never a best response (only f − 
is). Therefore, sellers choosing segmentation as a continuation equilibrium when indifferent is consistent
with equilibrium play of the full game.
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distinction is that in the lower interval, sellers may agglomerate on platform i (i.e., this
happens if fj > fi + δ) but will never agglomerate on platform j. That is, if fi is in
this lower interval, platform i will always obtain a positive profit. By contrast, if fi is an
element of the upper interval, with some probability sellers will choose to agglomerate
on platform j—this occurs if platform j charges fj < fi − δ—and platform i obtains no
profit. Platform i’s profit can then be written as
Πi(fi, fj) =

0, if fi ∈ (fj + δ, 4δ] ∧ fj ∈ [2δ, 3δ);
fi, if fi ∈ [max{2δ, fj − δ},min{fj + δ, 4δ}] ∧ fj ∈ [2δ, 4δ];
2fi, if fi ∈ [2δ, fj − δ) ∧ fj ∈ (3δ, 4δ].
Let us start with the case in which platform i charges a fee in the lower interval—that
is, fi ∈ [2δ, 3δ). Denote the cumulative density function with which platform j mixes by
G1(fj). Platform i’s profit with a fee in this lower interval is then given by (replacing fi
by f)
G1(f + δ)f + (1−G1(f + δ)) 2f.
In equilibrium, this expression must be equal to 3δ, yielding
G1(f + δ)f + (1−G1(f + δ)) 2f = 3δ. (4)
This equation determines the mixing probabilities of platform j in its upper interval.
This is because only if platform j sets a fee above f + δ (which happens with probability
1−G1(f + δ)), sellers will agglomerate on platform i. Such a fee must necessarily be in
the upper interval.
If platform i charges a fee in the upper interval—that is, fi ∈ [3δ, 4δ]—its profit is
G1(f − δ)0 + (1−G1(f − δ)) f = 3δ. (5)
This equation determines the mixing probability in the lower interval.
Let us first look at (4). We can substitute h ≡ f + δ to get
G1(h) (h− δ) + (1−G1(h)) 2 (h− δ) = 3δ. (6)
Recall that (4) was relevant for f in the lower range and, since h = f + δ, these are
exactly the fees in the upper interval. Solving (6) for G1(h) gives
G1(h) =
2h− 5δ
h− δ . (7)
It is easy to check that G1(4δ) = 1.
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Now we turn to (5). Here, we can substitute h ≡ f − δ representing that h is now in
the lower interval. We obtain
(1−G1(h)) (h+ δ) = 3δ. (8)
Solving (8) for G1(h) gives
G1(h) =
h− 2δ
h+ δ
. (9)
It is easy to check that G1(2δ) = 0. Using (7) and (9), we obtain lim
h↘3δ
= 1/2 and
lim
h↗3δ
= 1/4. This implies the existence of a mass point with mass 1/4 at a fee equal to
3δ.47
The resulting mixing probability is characterized by the cumulative distribution func-
tion
G1(f) =
{
f−2δ
f+δ
, if f ∈ [2δ, 3δ);
2f−5δ
f−δ , if f ∈ [3δ, 4δ].
Because the distribution is not absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue mea-
sure, it fails to have a density. Nevertheless, we define a generalized density, which is
a generalized function (since it will be comprised of a dirac delta function) such that
integration against this generalized function yields the correct desired probabilities. The
corresponding probability density function is given by
g1(f) = G
′
1(f) +
1
4
δD(f − 3δ),
where
G′1(f) =
{
3δ
(f+δ)2
, if f ∈ [2δ, 3δ);
3δ
(f−δ)2 , if f ∈ [3δ, 4δ],
and δD(f − f0) denotes Dirac’s delta function which is 0 everywhere except for f0 where
it is ∞. Furthermore, ∫ δD(f − f0)df = 1. Inserting δ = pim/2 − pid yields the result
stated in the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 4. As shown in the proof of the previous proposition, a pure-strategy
equilibrium in the region 1/4 < pid/pim < 1/2 does not exist. Furthermore, for 3/8 ≤
pid/pim < 1/2, there exists a mixed-strategy equilibrium which has an upper bound of the
randomization domain equal to 2pim − 4pid. This equilibrium cannot exist in the range
47Intuitively, equation (5) requires a sufficiently high probability of f − δ being close to 3δ since, as
otherwise setting f close to 4δ would lead to zero profit “too often”.
Segmentation versus Agglomeration 50
1/4 < pid/pim < 3/8 because 2pim− 4pid would then be larger than pim/2. We next derive
the randomization domain of the mixed-strategy equilibrium with an upper bound of
pim/2.
Randomization domain. Suppose that platform j sets fj = pi
m/2. The best response
of platform i is then to set fi to induce agglomeration in the second stage. To do so, it
needs to set fi = pi
d− . The best response of platform j is to marginally reduce its fee to
pim/2− and induce a segmentation again, and so on. This goes on until platform i sets the
lowest fee in the randomization domain, denoted by f l. This is the fee at which platform
i is better off by raising its fee to the highest fee pim/2 and induce segmentation instead
of marginally reducing it to induce agglomeration. Its segmentation profit is then pim/2.
Hence, the lowest fee f l is given by 2f l = pim/2 or, equivalently, f l = pim/4. This fee
makes sellers exactly indifferent between agglomeration on platform i and segmentation
if platform j charges a fee such that pid−f l = pim/2−fj or, equivalently, fj = 3pim/4−pid.
Finally, note that a fee pid −  (i.e., the fee that induces agglomeration if the rival
platform charges the highest fee) is strictly lower than 3pim/4− pid (i.e., the fee at which
the rival stops lowering its fee and instead raises the fee to the highest one) since we are
in the range pid/pim < 3/8. Therefore, the upper bound of the lower interval is below the
lower bound of the upper interval. It follows that there are two disjoint sets of mixing
intervals. The upper one [3pim/4−pid, pim/2], in which each fee is a best response to a fee
in the lower interval [pim/4, pid). In turn, each fee in the lower interval is a best response
to a fee in the upper interval.
To summarize the above analysis, in the range 1/4 < pid/pim < 3/8, there is a mixed-
strategy equilibrium with fees fi ∈ [pim/4, pid) ∪ [3pim/4− pid, pim/2]. For any chosen fee,
the expected profit in this range must be 3pim/4− pid. As above, this is because setting
a fee equal to 3pim/4− pid induces segmentation with a probability of (almost) 1.
Mixing Probabilities. Let η ≡ pid−pim/4, δ ≡ pim/2−pid and  > 0 but infinitesimally
small. Denote f l ≡ pim/4, f l ≡ pid, fu ≡ 3pim/4 − pid, and fp ≡ pim/2 such that the
domain of interest can be expressed as fi ∈ [f l, f l) ∪ [fu, fu]. Using η and δ, the mixing
domain can be written as fi ∈ [η + δ, 2η + δ) ∪ [η + 2δ, 2η + 2δ]. For i, j ∈ {A,B} and
i 6= j, the corresponding best response function is given by
ˆˆ
fi(fj) =

fj + δ, if fj ∈ [f l, f l);
fj + η, if fj = f
u;
fj − δ − , if fj ∈ (fu, fu].
We know that all fees in the mixing domain must give an expected profit of fu =
(3/4)pim − pid = η + 2δ.
We now proceed analogously to the proof of Proposition 3. If platform i charges a
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fee in the lower interval—that is, fi ∈ [f l, f l)—we obtain an equation analogous to (4),
given by
G2(f + δ)f + (1−G2(f + δ)) 2f = η + 2δ. (10)
This equation determines the mixing probabilities in the upper range.
In case platform i charges a fee in the upper range, that is, fi ∈ [fu, fu], the equation
is
G2(f − δ)0 + (1−G2(f − δ)) f = η + 2δ. (11)
This equation determines the mixing probability in the lower range.
Let us first look at (10). Substituting h ≡ f + δ and solving for G2(h) gives
G2(h) =
2h− 4δ − d
h− δ . (12)
It is easy to check that lim
f↘fu
G2(f) = lim
f↘η+2δ
G2(f) = δ/(η + δ). Moreover, lim
f↗fu
G2(f) =
lim
f↗2δ+2η
G2(f) = 3δ/(2δ + η) < 1. The latter implies the existence of a mass point with
mass 1− 3δ/(2δ + η) = (δ − η)/(2η + δ) at a fee equal to fu = 2(η + δ).48
Consider (11). We substitute h ≡ f − δ. Thus, h is now in the lower range. Solving
for G2(h) gives
G2(h) =
h− η − δ
h+ δ
. (13)
It is easy to check that G2(f) = G2(η + δ) = 0, whereas lim
f↗f l
G2(f) = lim
f↗2η+δ
G2(f) =
δ/(2(η+δ)). Note that lim
f↗f l
G2(f) = δ/(2(η+δ)) < δ/(η+δ) = lim
f↘fu
G2(f), which implies
the existence of a second mass point with mass δ/(2(η+ δ)) at a fee equal to fu = η+ 2δ.
The resulting mixing probability is characterized by a cumulative distribution function
of
G2(f) =

f−η−δ
f+δ
, if f ∈ [η + δ, 2η + δ);
2f−η−4δ
f−δ , if f ∈ [η + 2δ, 2(η + δ));
1, if f = 2(η + δ).
The corresponding generalized density is given by
g2(f) = G
′
2(f) +
η
2(η + δ)
δD(f − (η + 2δ)) + δ − η
(2η + δ)
δD(f − (2(η + δ))),
48Intuitively, in order to satisfy (10), there must be a positive probability of inducing an agglomeration
equilibrium and receiving 2f in the lower range even for f = f
l
. This is achieved by a mass point at
h = f
u
.
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where
G′2(f) =
{
η+2δ
(f+δ)2
, if f ∈ [η + δ, 2η + δ);
η+2δ
(f−δ)2 , if f ∈ [η + 2δ, 2(η + δ)),
and δD(f − f0) denotes Dirac’s delta function. Replacing η and δ by their respective
definitions yields the result stated in the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 5. In stage 4, both multi-homing and single-homing buyers make
their optimal buying decisions, given the prices charged by sellers in the third stage. In
the third stage, the pricing equilibrium in the product market may be different than with
single-homing buyers. If both sellers in a category are on the same platform, they will still
charge a price of pd in equilibrium and obtain a profit of pid per buyer. Similarly, if only
one seller is active, this seller sets its price equal to pim and earns pim per buyer. However,
if sellers segment and one is active on platform A and the other one on platform B, sellers
no longer charge pm. The reason is that a fraction α of buyers (i.e., the multi-homers)
is informed about both offers. Therefore, the price charged by a seller depends on how
many buyers are informed about both offers. We denote the price charged by a seller
in this situation by p(α), with p(α) ∈ [min{pd, pm},max{pd, pm}], and the respective
per-buyer profit by pi(α), with pid/pim ≤ pi(α)/pim ≤ 1.
Turning to the second stage, we know that profits in an agglomeration and a stand-
alone equilibrium are unchanged. This is not true for the segmentation equilibrium. If
sellers segment, the total number of buyers for each seller is (1 + α)/2, as explained in
the main text. The profit of a seller active on platform i is then pi(α)(1+α)/2−fi. If the
seller deviates and becomes active on platform −i, it obtains a profit of pid(1+α)/2−f−i.
It follows that there is no deviation incentive if
fi ≤ min
{(
pi(α)− pid) (1 + α)
2
+ f−i, pi(α)
(1 + α)
2
}
.
In contrast to the case with single-homing buyers where the relevant condition was given
by (3), the buyer mass 1/2 is now replaced by (1 + α)/2 and the monopoly profit pim
is replaced by pi(α). Proceeding in the same way as in Appendix A, we obtain that in
the second stage there is unique equilibrium and the conditions for the agglomeration,
the segmentation, and stand-alone equilibrium to occur are still the same as given there,
with pim/2 replaced by pi(α)(1 + α)/2.
We can now move to the first-stage. Following the same argument as in the proof of
Proposition 1, we obtain that in the range pid ≥ pi(α)(1 +α)/2 an agglomeration equilib-
rium with fees fi = f−i = 0 is the unique equilibrium. Similarly, if both platforms charge
a fee of pi(α)(1+α)/2, the only equilibrium is that sellers segment, and a platform’s profit
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equals pi(α)(1 + α)/4. A platform has no incentive to deviate from this fee combination,
if
pid ≤ pi(α)1 + α
4
.
Hence, in this range, the unique equilibrium involves fi = f−i = pi(α)(1 + α)/2 and a
segmentation equilibrium occurs.
It is evident that the regions are the same as in case where α = 0 with the difference
that pim/2 is replaced by pi(α)(1 + α)/2. The same logic applies for the region
pi(α)
1 + α
2
> pid > pi(α)
1 + α
4
.
By following the same steps as in the proofs of Propositions 1 through 4, we obtain the
same results as in those propositions.
Proof of Proposition 6. Stage 4 works in the same way as without multi-homing: given
sellers’ prices, buyers make their optimal purchasing decisions. In stage 3, due to the
possibility of multi-homing, new competition situations can occur. As mentioned in the
main text, these are that, in a category, either both sellers multi-home or that only
one seller multi-homes whereas the other single-homes on platform i. In the former
situation, regardless of the distribution of buyers, all buyers are informed about both
sellers’ offers. It follows that sellers in the third stage will set a price of pd, leading
to a profit of pid − fA − fB for both sellers. In the latter situation, sellers compete in
an asymmetric way, as the multi-homing seller reaches all buyers, whereas the single-
homing seller reaches only buyers on platform i. If platform i is host to x ∈ (0, 1) buyers,
we denote the prices set by the sellers in the third-stage equilibrium by pSH(x) for the
single-homing seller and by pMH(x) for the multi-homing seller. The respective per-buyer
profits are piSH(x) and piMH(x), respectively, which implies that the profits of the two
sellers are xpiSH(x)− fi and piMH(x)− fA − fB.49
We turn to the second stage. We first determine the conditions under which the
different equilibrium configurations determined in the game with single-homing are still
Nash equilibria with multi-homing. First, as before, agglomeration on platform i is an
equilibrium if fi ≤ pid. As there is no buyer on the other platform, the possibility to
multi-home does not change the outcome. The same holds true for the stand-alone
equilibrium on platform i, which is a Nash equilibrium whenever pid < fi ≤ pim. Turning
to the segmentation equilibrium, in addition to the deviations considered in Appendix
A, a seller can now also choose to multi-home. This is not profitable if and only if
49The per-buyer profit of the multi-homing seller, piMH(x), is a weighted average of the profit obtained
from buyers on platform i who are informed about both offers and the profit from buyers on platform
−i who only observe the multi-homing seller’s offer.
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pim/2 − fi ≥ piMH − fi − f−i, where piMH ≡ piMH(1/2). Therefore, the conditions under
which a segmentation equilibrium exists are more demanding than in the case of single-
homing; they are given by
fi ≤ min
{
pim − pid
2
+ f−i,
pim
2
}
and f−i ≥ piMH − pi
m
2
. (14)
In addition to these equilibria which involve single-homing of sellers, there can also
be equilbria which involve multi-homing along the equilibrium path. One is a full multi-
homing equilibrium in which both sellers multi-home and buyers split evenly on platforms.
This is a Nash equilibrium if no seller has an incentive to deviate to single-homing—that
is, pid − fi − f−i ≥ piSH/2− fi and, thus, in equilibrium, f−i ≤ pid − piSH/2.
In addition, there can be a partial multi-homing equilibrium with the following struc-
ture: In each category, one seller multi-homes and the other one single-homes. A single-
homing seller is active on platform A in half of the categories and on platform B in the
other half of the categories. Buyers are indifferent, as each platform has, in expectation,
the same number of sellers in the buyers’ preferred category and, therefore, buyers will
split evenly. A multi-homing seller’s profit is piMH − fA − fB and the profit of a seller
single-homing on platform i is piSH/2− fi.
We determine the conditions under which this configuration is a Nash equilibrium.
First, any single-homing seller must earn non-negative profits—that is, piSH/2− fi ≥ 0.
Second, it must be optimal for any such sellers to single-home on platform i instead of
single-homing on platform −i—that is, piSH/2− fi ≥ piSH/2− f−i. Third, single-homing
must be better than multi-homing for this seller—that is, piSH/2− fi ≥ piMH − fi − f−i.
Moreover, the multi-homing seller must be better off with multi-homing than with single-
homing on platform i or −i. These conditions are satisfied if piMH − fi− f−i ≥ pid/2− fi
and piMH − fi − f−i ≥ pim/2− f−i.
The same conditions must also hold with fi and f−i interchanged because, in the
partial multi-homing equilibrium, one half of the single-homing sellers are on platform A
and the other half on platform B. Importantly, this implies that piSH/2−f−i ≥ piSH/2−fi.
Taken together with the condition piSH/2 − fi ≥ piSH/2 − f−i (which has been derived
above), this shows that a partial multi-homing equilibrium can only exist if fi = f−i.50
Using fi = f−i together with all other conditions derived above, we obtain partial multi-
homing is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
fi = f−i, fi ≤ pi
SH
2
, and pid − pi
SH
2
≤ fi ≤ piMH − pi
m
2
. (15)
50Therefore, in the fA-fB-diagram presented in Figure 1, the partial multi-homing equilibrium can
only exist on the 45-degree line.
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As follows from (14) and (15), the partial multi-homing equilibrium and the segmentation
equilibrium co-exist if and only if fi = f−i = piMH − pim/2.
Next, we apply our refinement. First, it is easy to see that the full multi-homing
equilibrium is never coalition-proof. Take the coalition of all sellers and all buyers on
platform i, and consider a deviation in which all buyers go to platform −i and sellers
single-home on platform −i. Then buyers get the same utility as with full multi-homing
but sellers are better off as they receive a profit of pid − f−i > pid − fi − f−i. Therefore,
full multi-homing never survives our refinement.
Turning to the partial multi-homing equilibrium, we determine the conditions for
coalition-proofness of this equilibrium. First, single-homing sellers on platform i can
form a coalition with buyers on platform i and deviate to be active only on platform −i.
Buyers are then better off, as they are informed about all offers on platform −i and sellers
compete in all categories whereas sellers are only better off if pid − f−i > piSH/2 − fi.
As the partial multi-homing Nash equilibrium only exists for fi = f−i, we obtain that
such a deviation is not profitable if piSH/2 ≥ pid. Second, multi-homing sellers can form
a coalition with all buyers on the platform where the sellers are monopolists (platform
i, say) and single-home on platform −i. Buyers are better off, as sellers compete on
platform −i, whereas the originally multi-homing sellers are better off if and only if
pid − f−i > piMH − fi − f−i. Therefore, this deviation is not profitable if fi ≤ piMH − pid.
(The other deviations by sellers do not involve coalitions and, therefore, are already
captured by the conditions for the Nash equilibrium to exist.) We now combine these
conditions with the ones derived in (15). Since coalition-proofness requires piSH/2 ≥ pid,
the lower bound on fi derived in (15) would be weakly negative and, thus, can be replaced
by zero. In addition, the condition piSH/2 ≥ pid also implies pid/pim ≤ 1/2 and, therefore,
piMH − pim/2 ≤ piMH − pid. Hence, the upper bound on fi is min{piSH/2, piMH − pim/2}.
To sum up, the partial multi-homing equilibrium is coalition-proof only if
fi = f−i,
piSH
2
≥ pid, and fi ≤ min
{
piSH
2
, piMH − pi
m
2
}
. (16)
Next, we determine whether the partial multi-homing equilibrium is in fact selected
in the second stage, given that other equilibrium configurations are coalition-proof as
well. From above, we know that it exists together with the segmentation equilibrium
if and only if fi = f−i = piMH − pim/2. The segmentation equilibrium is then also
coalition-proof and preferred by sellers over the agglomeration equilibrium if pim/2 > pid
(see Appendix A). The profit of a seller in the segmentation equilibrium is pim/2− fi =
pim−piMH . Instead, in the partial multi-homing equilibrium, a single-homing seller’s profit
is piSH/2−fi = (piSH +pim)/2−piMH , which is strictly below the one in the segmentation
equilibrium. A multi-homing seller’s profit is piMH − 2fi = pim− piMH and, therefore, the
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same as in the segmentation equilibrium. It follows that the segmentation equilibrium
profit-dominates the partial multi-homing equilibrium. Hence, if pim/2 > pid, the partial-
multi-homing equilibrium is selected in stage 2 if (16) holds, with the strengthening of
the last condition to fi ≤ piSH/2 and fi < piMH − pim/2.
If instead pim/2 ≤ pid, the partial-multi-homing equilibrium may co-exist with the
agglomeration equilibrium. Because the partial multi-homing equilibrium exists only if
piSH/2 ≥ pid and both fees are the same, the single-homing seller is better off in the
partial multi-homing equilibrium. Since piMH ≥ piSH , the multi-homing seller is better
off as well. Hence, if pim/2 ≤ pid, the partial multi-homing equilibrium will be chosen in
the second stage whenever (16) is fulfilled.
If the partial multi-homing equilibrium does not exist, for fi, f−i ≥ piMH − pim/2,
the same analysis to select an equilibrium as in Appendix A applies, as in this case the
same equilibria exist as without multi-homing. If instead one or both fees are lower
than piMH − pim/2, it follows from (14) that a segmentation equilibrium does not exist.
However, we know from the analysis in Appendix A (see also Figure 1) that in this region
either an agglomeration or a stand-alone equilibrium prevails, depending on parameters.
It follows that, off the diagonal, there is a unique equilibrium in the second stage even
with seller multi-homing, given our selection criterion.
We turn to the first stage. Let us first consider the case pid/pim ≥ 1/2. This implies
that pid > piSH/2, as pim > piSH . Therefore, the partial multi-homing equilibrium does
not exist in this case. It follows that the analysis of the proof of Proposition 1 applies,
leading to fA = fB = 0 in equilibrium, and buyers and sellers play an agglomeration
equilibrium in the second stage.
Second, consider the case pid/pim ≤ 1/4. In the pure-strategy segmentation equilib-
rium of Proposition 2, platforms set fA = fB = pi
m/2. As pim/2 > piMH − pim/2, due
to the fact that pim > piMH , the segmentation equilibrium exists in this case. From the
analysis of the second stage, it follows that the partial multi-homing equilibrium does
not exist then, and from the proof of Proposition 2 it follows that the pure-strategy seg-
mentation equilibrium is the unique equilibrium in this case. This establishes the first
part of the proposition.
Turning to the range 1/2 > pid/pim > 1/4, we first consider the situation in which
pid > piSH/2, that is, the partial multi-homing equilibrium does not exist. We know
from above that for piMH ≤ pim/2, the segmentation equilibrium exists, which implies
that the equilibrium is the same mixed-strategy equilibrium as the one characterized in
Propositions 3 and 4. By contrast, for piMH > pim/2, a segmentation equilibrium does
not exist. We will now check under which conditions the possibility to multi-home breaks
the mixed-strategy equilibrium of Propositions 3 and 4. This equilibrium exists if the
circle of best responses described in the proofs of these propositions works in the same
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way if sellers can multi-home. However, this circle does no longer exist if one of the fees
in the mixing range is below piMH − pim/2. The reason is as follows: Suppose platform
i sets a fee below piMH − pim/2. Platform −i’s best response in case of single-homing
sellers was to set a higher fee to induce segmentation. However, inducing segmentation
is no longer possible with multi-homing sellers. As a consequence, the best response of
platform −i to a listing fee of fi below piMH − pim/2 is to undercut this fee slightly to
induce an agglomeration equilibrium on platform −i in the second stage. The lowering
of fees then leads to the agglomeration equilibrium with fA = fB = 0.
It remains to be checked under which conditions the lowest fee in the mixing range
is below piMH − pim/2. Starting with the first mixing region we obtain that this holds if
piMH − pim/2 > pim − 2pid or, equivalently,
piMH >
3pim
2
− 2pid.
If this inequality holds, then piMH is also larger than pim/2, implying that any equilibrium
features fA = fB = 0 and agglomeration prevails at the second stage. Instead, if pi
MH ≤
3pim/2−2pid, the unique equilibrium is the mixed-strategy one, as reported in Proposition
3.
Proceeding in the same way for the second mixing region, we obtain that for
piMH >
3pim
4
any equilibrium features fA = fB = 0 and agglomeration, whereas for pi
MH ≤ 3pim/4, the
unique equilibrium is the mixed-strategy one, as reported in Proposition 4.
Second, we consider the situation pid ≤ piSH/2. The partial multi-homing equilibrium
then exists for fees fA = fB, with fi ≤ piSH/2 and fi < piMH − pim/2, i = A,B. The
profit of each platform is 3/2fi. However, each platform then has an incentive to lower its
fee slightly. This induces agglomeration (as the segmentation equilibrium does not exist
for fi < pi
MH − pim/2). The resulting profit of the platform with the lower fee (platform
i, say) is then 2fi. Hence, undercutting is profitable. As a consequence, if a partial
multi-homing equilibrium exists in the full game, it can only occur with fA = fB = 0.
But, then, the same mechanism as described for the case pid > piSH/2 occurs. The mixed-
strategy equilibrium is the unique equilibrium in the first stage for the same region as in
case pid > piSH/2. In the other region, in equilibrium, platforms set their fees equal to
zero. However, in contrast to the case above, for pid ≤ piSH/2, buyers and sellers in the
second stage play the partial multi-homing equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 7. The third and fourth stage play out similarly as in the case with
listing fees. In the fourth stage, buyers buy according to their demand functions, that
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is, a buyer active on platform i either faces a seller price of pm(φi) or p
d(φi), depending
on the number on sellers on platform i, and then buys the respective number of goods
Dm(φi) or D
d(φi). In stage 3, a seller on platform i sets p
m(φi) or p
d(φi), depending on
the number of rival sellers (either 0 or 1) active on the platform in the seller’s product
category.
We turn to the second stage. Following the same arguments as in case of listing fees,
there potentially exist three types of equilibria with per-transaction fees: agglomeration
equilibria, segmentation equilibria, and stand-alone equilibria. In an agglomeration equi-
librium on platform i, a seller’s profit is pid(φi), whereas in a segmentation equilibrium,
the seller’s profit is pim(φi)/2. In a stand-alone equilibrium on platform i, the profit of
an active seller is pim(φi) and the one of an inactive seller is 0. However, since platforms
charge per-transaction fees, if φi is such that D
m(φi) > 0 and thereby also pi
m(φi) > 0,
also the inactive seller in each category could make a positive profit by becoming active
on platform i. The reason is that for Dm(φi) to be positive, φi must be below the in-
tercept of the demand curve. This implies that also in duopoly sellers will charge prices
such that Dd(φi) > 0, leading to pi
d(φi) > 0. Since platforms in the first stage will never
optimally charge a fee which leads to zero demand for sellers, as this implies zero profits
also for platforms, we can restrict attention to those subgames in the second stage in
which fees satisfy Dd(φi) > 0.
51 For such fees, a stand-alone equilibrium does not exist in
the second stage and, thus, will never occur along the equilibrium path of the full game.
Next, we determine the equilibrium that is played in the second stage, given our
selection criterion. First, consider the case pid(0)/pim(0) ≥ 1/2. Due to the assump-
tion ∂pim(φi)/∂φi ≤ ∂pid(φi)/∂φi ≤ 0, the condition pid(0)/pim(0) ≥ 1/2 implies that
pid(φi)/pi
m(φi) ≥ 1/2 ∀φi. In this case, a segmentation equilibrium cannot exist in the
second stage. The reason is that a coalition of all sellers and buyers on the platform
with the higher fee have the incentive to deviate to the rival platform. It follows that for
pid(0)/pim(0) ≥ 1/2 only an agglomeration equilibrium exists.
Second, suppose that pid(0)/pim(0) < 1/2. Then, for φi, φ−i > 0 but small enough,
we have pid(φ−i) < 1/2pim(φi). In this case, the segmentation equilibrium is the unique
equilibrium selected by our refinement. To see this, note that in a segmentation equi-
librium, sellers on platform i obtain a profit of 1/2pim(φi) and those on platform −i
a profit of 1/2pim(φ−i). A seller active on the platform with the larger fee—for in-
stance, platform i so that φi ≥ φ−i—has no profitable deviation from this configuration
if 1/2pim(φi) ≥ 1/2pid(φ−i). This implies that for pim(φi) ≥ pid(φ−i), segmentation is a
Nash equilibrium. In addition, agglomeration is a Nash equilibrium for all fees φi such
that Dd(φi) > 0. Therefore, multiple Nash equilibria exist in this range. Applying
51If the demand is unbounded (as, for example, with CES demand), implying that there is no demand
intercept, this argument holds true independent of the level of the fee.
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coalition-proofness, it is evident from the same arguments as in the previous paragraph
that the segmentation equilibrium is eliminated if pid(φ−i) ≥ 1/2pim(φi). Thus, if fees
are such that pid(φ−i) ≥ 1/2pim(φi), the unique equilibrium selected by our refinement is
the agglomeration equilibrium on platform i because the segmentation equilibrium is not
coalition-proof.52
For pid(φ−i) < 1/2pim(φi), coalition-proofness does not destroy the segmentation equi-
librium. Applying, in addition, profit dominance of sellers, selects the segmentation
equilibrium as the unique equilibrium. The reason is that a seller’s profit in a segmenta-
tion equilibrium is at least 1/2pim(φi), which is larger than the one in the agglomeration
equilibrium, where a seller obtains only pid(φ−i). Since the condition pid(φ−i) < 1/2pim(φi)
is stronger than pid(φ−i) ≤ pim(φi) (i.e., the condition for a segmentation equilibrium to
exist), the segmentation equilibrium is selected by our refinement, whenever the condition
holds.
Given our refinement, the equilibrium in the second stage is summarized as follows:
Suppose that φi ≥ φ−i. If pid(0)/pim(0) ≥ 1/2, agglomeration equilibrium on platform −i
occurs. If, by contrast, pid(0)/pim(0) < 1/2, the segmentation equilibrium is played for
1/2pim(φi) > pi
d(φ−i) and agglomeration on platform −i occurs for 1/2pim(φi) ≤ pid(φ−i).
We turn to the first stage. Following the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition
1, it is evident that for pid(0)/pim(0) ≥ 1/2, the unique equilibrium implies (φ?A, φ?B) =
(0, 0), as sellers will coordinate on the platform with the lower per-transaction fee. This
establishes the first part of the proposition.
For pid(0)/pim(0) < 1/2, we establish next the constraints under which a pure-strategy
segmentation equilibrium exists. The highest platform profits that can be obtained in
a segmentation equilibrium is reached with fees φA = φB = φ
m. Then, platform i can
induce agglomeration only by setting a fee φi such that pi
d(φi) ≥ pim(φm)/2. Denoting the
largest such fee by φ′ (as in the proposition), such a deviation to φi = φ′ is not profitable
if φmDm(φm)/2 ≥ 2φ′Dd(φ′). This establishes the second part of the proposition, which
reports equilibrium transaction fees (φ?A, φ
?
B) = (φ
m, φm).
Finally, by the same arguments as in Section 3, there is no pure-strategy equilibrium
in the range such that pid(0)/pim(0) < 1/2 and φmDm(φm) < 4φ′Dd(φ′). In this case,
the mixed-strategy equilibrium can be obtained in a similar way as in the proofs of
Propositions 3 and 4. In particular, there will again be two regions, one in which mixing
occurs on a convex set and the other in which mixing occurs on a non-convex set. Let us
characterize the mixed-strategy equilibrium in each of those two regions.
In the region in which mixing occurs on a convex set, we denote the upper and the
52Note that because ∂pim(φi)/∂φi ≤ ∂pid(φi)/∂φi ≤ 0, we can have pid(0)/pim(0) < 1/2 but pid(φ−i) ≥
1/2pim(φi) if fees are sufficiently high. Then, a segmentation equilibrium is played if fees are close to
zero but an agglomeration one for high fees.
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lower bound of the range by φ¯ and φ, respectively. A platform must be indifferent between
setting φ¯ and φ, which leads to
2Dd(φ)φ =
Dm(φ¯)φ¯
2
. (17)
In addition, following the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 3, there exists a fee,
denoted by φ˜, in the interior of the randomization domain, which induces segmentation
with probability (almost) 1. At this fee, sellers are indifferent between agglomeration and
segmentation if one platform charges φ˜ and the other φ, which yields
pid(φ) =
pim(φ˜)
2
. (18)
The same holds if one platform charges φ˜ and the other φ¯, which yields
pim(φ¯)
2
= pid(φ˜). (19)
The three equations (17), (18), and (19) determine the three fees φ˜, φ¯, and φ and, thus,
the mixing range. By our assumption that pim falls to a larger extent than pid with an
increase in the per-transaction fee and that the same relation holds true for Dm and Dd,
the three fees φ˜, φ¯, and φ are uniquely determined.
The best-response function φi(φj) is implicitly defined by
pim(φi)
2
= pid(φj) for φj = [φ, φ˜],
and
pid(φi) =
pim(φj)
2
for φj = (φ˜, φ¯].
Using these best responses and determining expected profits, we derive the mixing prob-
abilities. We obtain that, in equilibrium,
G(φ) =
ξ(φ)Dm(ξ(φ))− φ˜Dm(φ˜)
ξ(φ)Dm(ξ(φ))
if φ = [φ, φ˜], (20)
with ξ(φ) ≡ (pim)−1 (2pid(φ)), and
G(φ) =
4ψ(φ)Dd(ψ(φ))− φ˜Dm(φ˜)
4ψ(φ)Dd(ψ(φ))− ψ(φ)Dm(ψ(φ)) if φ = (φ˜, φ¯], (21)
with ψ(φ) ≡ (pid)−1 (pim(φ)/2). The mixing probabilities given by (20) and (21), together
with the equations determining φ˜, φ¯, and φ characterize the mixed-strategy equilibrium,
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which exists if φ¯ ≤ φm.
To see that G(φ) = 0, note that, from (18), we can write ξ(φ) = φ˜. Inserting this into
(20) yields G(φ) = 0. Similarly, from (19), we can deduce that ψ(φ¯) = φ˜. Inserting this
into (21) yields G(φ¯) = 1. To show that there is a mass point at φ = φ˜, we can use (20)
and (21) to get
lim
φ↗φ˜
G(φ) =
φ¯Dm(φ¯)− φ˜Dm(φ˜)
φ¯Dm(φ¯)
(22)
and
lim
φ↘φ˜
G(φ) =
4φDd(φ)− φ˜Dm(φ˜)
4φDd(φ)− φDm(φ) (23)
Using (17), which implies that φ¯Dm(φ¯) = 4φDd(φ), it is evident that the numerator of the
right-hand side of the previous two equations is the same. Comparing the denominators,
we obtain φ¯Dm(φ¯) = 4φDd(φ) > 4φDd(φ) − φ˜Dm(φ˜). Therefore, the denominator of
lim
φ↗φ˜
G(φ) is larger than the one lim
φ↘φ˜
G(φ), which yields lim
φ↗φ˜
G(φ) < lim
φ↘φ˜
G(φ). Hence,
there is a mass point at φ = φ˜.
If φ¯ > φm, this equilibrium cannot exist, as a platform will never find it optimal to set
a higher per-transaction fee than φm. In this region, we obtain an equilibrium with a non-
convex randomization domain. Following the proof of Proposition 4, the lower interval
is given by [φ′, φ′], where φ′ is implicitly defined by 2Dd(φ′)φ′ = Dm(φm)φm/2, and φ′
is defined as in the proposition. The upper interval is [φ′′, φm], where φ′′ is implicitly
defined by pid(φ′) = pim(φ′′)/2.53
The existence of mass points at φ = φ′′ and φ = φm can be shown as above. The
mixing probabilities can be derived in the same way as in the case with a convex set.
They are given by
G˜(φ) =
ξ(φ)Dm(ξ(φ))− φ′′Dm(φ′′)
ξ(φ)Dm(ξ(φ))
if φ = [φ′, φ′),
G˜(φ) =
4ψ(φ)Dd(ψ(φ))− φ′′Dm(φ′′)
4ψ(φ)Dd(ψ(φ))− ψ(φ)Dm(ψ(φ)) if φ = [φ
′′, φm),
and
G˜(φ) = 1 if φ = φm.
Proof of Proposition 8. The third and the fourth stage play out in a similar way as in
the baseline model. In the fourth stage, buyers make their buying decisions to maximize
utility, and in the third stage, sellers set their product prices, conditional on the number
53Due to our assumptions on the shape of the profit and demand functions, all boundaries are unique.
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of sellers in their product category on the platform.
In the first part of the proof, we determine the conditions under which fi = 0, ∀i =
1, ..., N , is an equilibrium of the full game. Note that, given fi = 0, ∀i = 1, ..., N , as
long as in the equilibrium of the second stage at least one platform does not carry any
trade, then no platform can profitably deviate by increasing its fee in the first stage. The
reason is that, if a platform carried a positive volume of trade in the equilibrium with
zero fees, then, after the deviation, sellers and buyers active on this platform would form
a coalition and move to one of the platforms with a fee of zero. If the deviating platform
carries no trade, a higher fee cannot make this platform better off since it will not attract
any buyers and sellers.
To determine the condition under which a platform could profitably deviate from
fi = 0, given that all other platforms charge a fee of zero, we distinguish between the
cases M = kN and M 6= kN . Recall that k is the largest integer such that M ≥ kN .
First, we analyze the case M = kN . We know from above that, given zero fees, a
platform only has an incentive to deviate to a strictly positive fee if all platforms carry
a positive volume of trade. The latter can only occur if each platform hosts k = M/N
sellers. This leads to a profit per seller of pi(k)/N ≥ 0. The most profitable deviation by
a coalition in the second stage is then that one seller moves to another platform together
with all buyers (as those benefit from the additional seller). The seller’s profit is then
pi(k + 1). It follows that for
pi(k + 1) <
pi(k)
N
, (24)
the deviation is not profitable for the seller, and an equilibrium exists in which all N
platforms carry a positive volume of trade. To the contrary, if the condition is not
fulfilled—i.e., pi(k+1) ≥ pi(k)/N as in condition (1)—no equilibrium candidate in stage 2
withN platforms carrying positive volumes of trade exists. Then, for fi = 0, ∀i = 1, ..., N ,
only a subset of platforms will carry a positive volume of trade, which implies that
no platform can profitable deviate from these fees. This proofs the first part of the
proposition for M = kN .
Second, consider the case M 6= kN . We start by demonstrating that there can never
be a coalition-proof equilibrium in which sellers in different categories split differently
on the platforms. To see this, consider the case in which all sellers and all platforms
are active. Buyers are then only indifferent between platforms if each one is on average
host to M/N sellers. To achieve this, we can split the mass of categories in N segments,
each with a mass 1/N . In each segment, a platform has either k or k + 1 sellers in
the respective categories, according to the following two rules. First, in each segment, a
number N(k + 1 −M/N) of platforms is host to k sellers and a number N(M/N − k)
is host to k + 1 sellers. Then, in each segment of categories, all M sellers are active.
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Second, we allocate to each platform k sellers in N(k+ 1)−M segments and k+ 1 sellers
in M − N(k) segments. Then, summing up over the categories, the average number of
sellers on each platform is M/N .54
However, such a distribution is not coalition-proof. Take one segment of categories
and consider all sellers who are active on a platform with k+ 1 sellers in their categories.
Take as a coalition one seller in each category within the segment together with all buyers
on the seller’s platform. This coalition has an incentive to go to a platform with only k
sellers. Per category, the deviating seller then obtains a profit (excluding the listing fee)
of 2pi(k+1)/N , whereas without the deviation the profit is only pi(k+1)/N . In addition,
also the buyers benefit as they now expect more sellers on the platform than before (i.e.,
the expected number of sellers is k + 1 instead of M/N). It follows that there exists a
profitable deviation from such an asymmetric equilibrium.
The same argument holds if only a subset of sellers is active. Therefore, if listing fees
are symmetric on all platforms, the equilibrium in the second stage must be symmetric
across all categories.
We now determine for the case M 6= kN , under which conditions fi = 0, ∀i = 1, ..., N ,
is an equilibrium in the first stage. Suppose first that only a subset of platforms has a
positive volume of trade. In this situation, sellers and buyers in the second stage choose
either agglomeration (that is, all buyers and all active sellers are on one platform) or an-
other distribution in which all platforms with positive market share host the same number
of sellers in all categories. The selected equilibrium depends on the profits that sellers
obtain and the numbers M and N .55 In this situation, following the same arguments as
in the case M = kN , no platform can profitably increase its fee.
Instead, suppose that all platforms carry a positive volume of trade. Proceeding
analogously to the case M = kN , we obtain inequality (24) also for the case M 6= kN .
We now show that if (24) holds, an equilibrium with zero fees will not be selected
by profit-dominance in the first stage. Suppose that (24) holds and all platforms charge
strictly positive fees. Then, slightly lowering the fee is not profitable for a platform, as
sellers and buyers will still play a segmentation equilibrium in the second stage, in which
all platforms have a positive market share and are host to k sellers. As a consequence,
an equilibrium with strictly positive fees exists. However, as M 6= kN , an equilibrium
54For example, if M = 11 and N = 4, we split the categories in 4 segments, each one with mass 1/4.
In the first one of these segments, platform 1 is host to 2 sellers in all categories in the segment, whereas
platforms 2, 3, and 4, are host to 3 sellers. In the second segment, platform 2 is host to 2 sellers and
all others platforms are host to 3 sellers, whereas in the third (fourth) segment, platform 3 (4) is host
to 2 sellers and the other platforms are host to 3 sellers. Then, each platform has on average 11/4 and
sellers and buyers are indifferent.
55Suppose, for example, that there are 10 sellers per category, 3 platforms, and pi(10) > 0. Then, in
the first equilibrium type, one platform is host to 10 sellers, whereas in the second equilibrium type, two
platforms host 5 sellers each.
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in which fi = 0, ∀i = 1, ..., N always exists since at least one platform will not carry
a positive trade volume. Yet, the latter is profit-dominated. Therefore, the equilibrium
with strictly positive fees will be selected in the first stage, whenever the two equilibria
co-exist. To sum up the analysis so far, in case M ≥ N , a pure-strategy equilibrium in
the first stage with fi = 0, ∀i = 1, ..., N exists and is selected if and only if condition (1)
is satisfied.
From the preceding arguments, it also follows that for M < N , the unique equilibrium
involves fi = 0, ∀i = 1, ..., N , as in any equilibrium in the second stage, only a subset of
platforms can carry a positive amount of trade.
In the second part of the proof, we turn to the segmentation equilibrium with positive
fees. From above, we know that for an equilibrium with positive fees to exist, all platforms
must carry a positive volume of trade. This implies that each platform will have a mass
of 1/N buyers. Suppose that in a segmentation equilibrium candidate, each platform
hosts l ∈ {1, ..., k} sellers. Then, a platform i can charge at most fi = pi(l)/N , leading
to a platform profit of Πi = lpi(l)/N and zero profits to sellers. Consider a coalition of
one seller on a platform j 6= i together with all buyers (i.e., not only those on platform
j but the whole buyer mass of 1). If this coalition deviates to platform i, all buyers
benefit as they now face l + 1 sellers instead of only l. The seller instead benefits only if
pi(l+ 1) > pi(l)/N . In addition, it is easy to check that this coalition leads to the tightest
condition for a segmentation equilibrium to exist in the second stage, as a deviation
involving more than one seller (per category) leads to lower seller profits. It follows that
segmentation is an equilibrium in the second stage if and only if pi(l)/N ≥ pi(l + 1).
We turn to the first stage and check if a platform has a profitable deviation from the
equilibrium candidate fi = pi(l)/N . Consider the deviation in which platform i sets a fee
slightly below pi(l+ 1). It then attracts l+ 1 sellers and, thereby, also all buyers. Hence,
the deviating platform’s profit is (l+1)pi(l+1). Therefore, this deviation is not profitable
if lpi(l)/N ≥ (l+ 1)pi(l+ 1). This condition is (weakly) stronger than pi(l)/N ≥ pi(l+ 1),
which was derived for the candidate segmentation equilibrium to exist in the second
stage. Thus, we can focus on the first stage.
By the same logic as in the previous paragraph, a platform can also deviate to any
fee slightly below pi(m), with l < m ≤ M . The most profitable deviation is therefore
to set a fee of pi(mˆ), with mˆ ∈ arg maxl<m≤M mpi(m). It follows that if there exists
some l ∈ {1, ..., k} such that (2) holds, a pure-strategy segmentation equilibrium exists
in which platforms charge fi = pi(l)/N . Applying profit-dominance in the first stage,
platforms choose fi = pi(l
?)/N , such that l? ∈ arg maxl∈{1,...,k} lpi(l) subject to condition
(2).
In the third part of the proof, we show that if (1) is not satisfied, this does not imply
that (2) holds (i.e., there can be a region in which neither condition is satisfied). To
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see this, note that for pi(k)/N > pi(k + 1), condition (1) is not satisfied. We now turn
to condition (2). Suppose first that l = k. Then, (2) holds if kpi(k)/N ≥ mˆpi(mˆ) or
pi(k)/N ≥ mˆpi(mˆ)/k. We know that mˆ > k, which implies that mˆ must be at least k+ 1.
Inserting mˆ = k + 1 into pi(k)/N ≥ mˆpi(mˆ)/k yields pi(k)/N ≥ (k + 1)pi(k + 1)/k. It is
easy to see that for
pi(k + 1) <
pi(k)
N
<
(k + 1)pi(k + 1)
k
neither (1) nor (2) is satisfied. Since the right-hand side of (2) is at least as high as
(k + 1)pi(k + 1) (due to the fact that mˆ is chosen to maximize mpi(m) with respect to
m), this also holds if mˆ 6= k + 1.
A similar argument obtains for the case in which l 6= k. Rewriting (2), we obtain
pi(l)/N ≥ mˆpi(mˆ)/l. The left-hand side of the previous inequality is larger than the right-
hand side of (1). However, pi(k)/N > pi(k + 1) does not rule out that there exists an mˆ,
such that pi(l)/N < mˆpi(mˆ)/l holds. In this case, again neither (1) nor (2) is satisfied.
Showing that there is a unique mixed-strategy equilibrium in this case follows from the
same arguments as in the proofs of Propositions 3 and 4. Platform profits in the mixed-
strategy equilibrium are strictly positive. This follows because, if pi(k + 1) ≥ pi(k)/N
is violated, each platform sets a strictly positive fee even if all other platforms charge
a fee of zero. Therefore, setting a fee equal to zero is not part of the mixing domain.
As a consequence, the mixed-strategy equilibrium profit-dominates the pure-strategy
equilibrium with f ?i = 0, ∀i = 1, ..., N , which exists for the case M 6= kN . Therefore, the
mixed-strategy equilibrium is always selected in the first stage.
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